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INTENTIONAL VALUES AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTA PLEA FOR CONSISTENCY IN CHURCH/STATE
RELATIONS
Mark E. Chopko*
INTRODUCTION

As the ancients once searched for truth, constitutional lawyers today,
especially those involved with religious organizations, search for ultimate
ways in which constitutional "truth" is revealed as a guide to the resolution
of serious and divisive contemporary issues. Religious institutions debate
with each other and with the state on such matters as the contribution of2
aid to the homeless,' their right to celebrate their holidays in public fora,

their ability to continue to supply needed child care resources in the community,3 the role of parental choice in making educational decisions, 4 the
legitimacy of the continuation of massive weapons programs,5 the proper
allocation of resources under government budgets, 6 and related questions.

Whether the discussions are with legislators, judges, or their sister religious
organizations, the debate is often intense and the issues sometimes defy
compromise. One of its more redeeming aspects is that regardless of whether
religious organizations agree on the particulars of an approach, they all
agree on several basic principles.

The author is General Counsel of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and
United States Catholic Conference in Washington, D.C. He is a 1974 graduate of the University
of Scranton and a 1977 law graduate of the Cornell Law School. The views expressed in the
Article are those of the author and not necessarily the views of the Conferences or any of its
Bishop members.
1. For example, a proposed rule of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
would have disqualified religiously-owned property from inclusion in a federal emergency shelter
program. See 51 Fed. Reg. 45,278 (1986).
2. Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (creche in county courthouse and menorah
outside city and county building); McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by
an equally divided court, 471 U.S. 83 (1985) (private creche in public park).
3. See, e.g., Act for Better Child Care Bill, S. 5, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. REP.
No. 484, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1988).
4. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (illustrates the character of the debate
which continues to this day). See generally E. McDONAGH, FREEDOM OR TOLERANCE 13-32
(1967); New Life Baptist Academy v. East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989); Vatican
II Council, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 5 (1965) [hereinafter "DECLARATION ON
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM"]. All three assert parental choice as an element of religious freedom.
*

5. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S
PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE (1983).
6. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL 318-20

(1986).
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First, they agree that the first amendment 7 is the most fundamental of
principles-it stands as an important protection for religion from the state
and was not intended to be the other way around.8 Second, they agree that
public questions on which moral aspects may be debated and resolved pervade
our society. As Cardinal Joseph Bernardin of Chicago has articulated:
Individuals, institutions, and governments frequently make important decisions that affect human lives about such issues as distribution of the
earth's resources, scientific research, and technological application. Increasingly, voices echoing the concepts of philosophers and the concerns
of ordinary people say that the distinctive mark of human genius is to
order every aspect of contemporary life in light of a moral vision. A moral
vision seeks to direct the resources of politics, economics, science, and
technology to the welfare of the human person and the human community.,
Significantly, the ability to add the moral dimension to the debate is linked
inextricably to the protections guaranteed by the religion clauses of the first
amendment.' 0 Third, regardless of their outlook on substantive issues or

particular applications of their unique moral principles, religious institutions
all agree that the taxing and regulatory powers of the state can have insidious
side effects when applied to the engines of religious organizations." Finally,
one of the more enduring proofs that the first amendment works, is seen in
the way churches may continue to play an important role in the public arena
without either expecting the benefits or suffering the burdens of such participation at the hands of the state.
The need for protection of personal religious liberty exercised through
religious organizations is one of the keys to understanding the colonial
experience and the process by which the United States was formed. In our
constitutional experience, the United States is unique among western nations

for its approach to dealing with religion. While other societies, including
colonial America, were rent apart by the "religious question," the United

States was spared much of this civil turmoil.' 2 The religion clauses were

7. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 1
8. 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 556 (1950).
9. Bernardin, The Role of the Religious Leader in the Development of Public Policy, 34
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1984).
10. Id. at 6.

11. D. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXEs 2 (1976); see Nyquist v. Committee
on Public Educ., 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
The list of religious organizations supporting the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), demonstrates the virtual
unanimity of this point, including Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and even separatist organizations.
12. The lamentable European and colonial experience with the entanglement of church and
state, and the resulting loss of religious liberty, was a dominant influence on the framers of
the first amendment. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-33 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 490 (1961); L. WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES 66-68 (1972). Colonial intol-
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designed to protect religious liberty by guaranteeing that no religion could

gain the special favor of the government and by assuring the equality and
not mere tolerance of various religious groups. Equality required the state
to avoid entanglement in the religious functions of churches, and to that
extent be separated from them.13 Both the individual and the institutional
4

or associational aspects of religious professions were protected.'
One of the dominant themes in church/state relations has been the search
for a useful guide for the resolution of these protracted public debates, often
cast in grand constitutional language. However, neither the courts nor the
legislatures have yet to identify one.15 It is to that question that this Article

turns. Questions of substance are equally interesting and unique, but cannot
be resolved adequately in an article of any length. This Article will focus on

the resolution of first amendment religion questions in church/state relations
as questions of process, addressing not the format of a definitive test but
the means by which certain transcendent values and concerns can guide
decisionmakers. It is an invitation to further debate and dialogue.
This author approaches the debate on church/state relations as both a

Catholic and a lawyer, providing both connections and viewpoints which are
not necessarily shared with others in the debate. A lawyer approaches the
debate, not necessarily from a historical or political view or even from the
perspective of denominational thought. A lawyer is immersed in these disciplines as a means to perform adequately the lawyer's job as counselor and
advocate. As a Catholic, this author approaches the debate on first amendment questions as one must from any honest religious tradition, that of a
minority in a larger pluralistic society.16 This Article makes no special claim

erance was compounded with Royal action from time to time as religious fortunes changed in
the Mother Country. James II, for example, denied freedom of worship in closed or diverted
colonial churches by Royal Decree. See B. LONG, GENESIS OF THE CONsrrrUTON OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 106 (1926).
13. L.

WHIPPLE,

supra note 12, at 72. See also REPORT OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY

COMMITTEE,

S. REP. No. 376, 32d Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1853). The elemental values of the religion clauses
are developed within Part II, infra.
14. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1872). Cf. E. McDONAOH, supra
note 4, at 18 (same principle from a religious perspective.)
15. See infra notes 52 and 72 for a discussion and critique of the Supreme Court's current
test.
16. J.C. MURRAY, SHOULD THERE BE A LAW? 168 (1960). Fr. Murray writes that many
often ask:
[W]hether Catholicism is compatible with American democracy. The question is
invalid as well as impertinent; for the manner of its position inverts the order of
values. It must, of course, be turned round to read, whether American democracy
is compatible with Catholicism. The question, thus turned, is part of the civil
question, as put to me. An affirmative answer to it, given under something better
than curbstone definition of 'democracy,' is one of the truths I hold.
Id. at ix-x.
A pivotal understanding of the Catholic identity and political questions is found in PASTORAL
CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD 76 (1965), a document of the Second
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to having deduced the essential theme of American constitutional or political
thought.1 7 Rather, this Article is concerned about two dominant phenomena
in church/state relations: result-oriented litigation without regard for the
larger constitutional principles and the haste by which resort to the Constitution is sought.
Result-oriented litigation itself inherently disserves the public interest because it abandons any pretense of a thorough evaluation of what is actually
at stake. It is as if mere invocation of the "first amendment" would have
some talismanic effect on other participants in the debate who, now provoked, retaliate in the incantation of constitutional forms. Hasty invocation
of the constitutional text tends to trivialize what should be a principle of
last resort."8 Many questions cast in constitutional language can either be
avoided or resolved short of the constitutional text altogether, without
resorting to a more vexatious process. The means to do so are within reach:
by examination of intentional values as a guide for constitutional interpretation and of the public interest as a guide for the resolution of disputes in
society. To these processes this Article will be addressed.
The ultimate touchstone in constitutional process is the preservation of
civic peace and tranquility. The Constitution did not intend to lay out a
philosophy for the life of mankind in society. It did not stake itself on
ultimate questions, but rather staked itself only to a theory of government. 19
The theory of American government, to the extent that it can be understood,
is that government cannot solve every problem, nor is every problem susceptible to legal solution. 20 It is to the greater society, the amalgamation of
forces, associations, individuals, and communities, that government addresses
itself. It is to the larger community that the enduring questions of what kind
of people we are and what kind of society we would be are to be addressed

Vatican Council. "The Church, by reason of her role and competence, is not identified in any
way with the political community nor bound to any political system. She is at once a sign and
a safeguard of the transcendent character of the human person." Id. As interpreted by Fr.
Bryan Hehir of Georgetown University, the Pastoral Constitution provides:
1) the ministry of the Church is religion in origin and purpose; the Church has no
specially political charisma; 2) the religious ministry has as its primary objective
serving the reign of God-Church is, in a unique way, the 'instrument' of the
Kingdom and history; 3) as the Church pursues its religious ministry it should
contribute to four objectives which have direct social and political consequences.
These objectives are protecting human dignity, promoting human rights, cultivating
the unity of the human family, and contributing a sense of meaning to every aspect
of human activity.
B. Hehir, Responsibilities and Temptations of Power: A Catholic View, J.L. & Religion 155,
158 (1990) (forthcoming).
17. Nor does its author claim to have the long experience with attendant wisdom on these
great questions that others may bring to the topic.
18. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
19. On this point, too, Father Murray is instructive. See J.C. MuRRAY, supra note 16, at
38-39.
20. Again, resort to "Catholic" roots is important. Id. at 8.
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and resolved for our civic peace. The Constitution illuminates a philosophy
of "domestic tranquility" 21 whereby these ultimate questions might be debated and resolved. On these ultimate questions, the Constitution is agnostic.
There is no place where this reality could be better felt than in church/state
litigation, and nowhere else is the philosophy most set aside.
The purpose here is not to review the battles past or rehearse battles to
come. The purpose is much more limited-to reflect on where the great
debates between religious organizations and between religion and the state
have come over the last several hundred years as described by both constitutional doctrine and case adjudications in the United States Supreme Court.
It is also to illustrate where we might go if certain adjustments are both
made and not made. The dynamism of the 1990's is intimately connected
with a search for balance between the vociferous competitors in the public
arena, each one addressing the same kinds of issues but from different
perspectives. The limitations on the state and, now, the consequent limitations the state is placing on religious organizations will both be brought into
sharper focus.
First, this Article will review the existing dynamic in church/state relations
as revealed in the law. It is not meant as an analysis of the "correctness"
of church adjudications although a view on their "correctness" is apparent
in the discussion. Second, there will be a review of the ways in which church
and state are interrelated and must work together, and a suggestion offered
for an alternative approach through which disputes might be avoided or
resolved amicably. Third, reflecting on the discussion of church and state
both serving the public interest, there will be some effort to address what
might best be termed "constitutional mythology," those doctrines which
have developed over time and have found their way into adjudication of
church/state disputes but which either lack a basis in constitutional intentions
or are inappropriate as pragmatic solutions to enduring problems. Finally,
in the last analysis, the problems remain of what the role of the state and
its proper relationship to religion should be, what the role of churches in
their relationships with the governing authority should be, and when such
relationships should yield to each other in a way that might best serve civic
harmony.
I.

THE PATTERN OF CASE ADJUDICATION,
INTENTIONS,

NOT CONSTITUTIONAL

INFORM CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS

Generally speaking, the ability of religious institutions to inform and
influence decisionmaking processes and to participate in public programs is
substantially diminished from what it might have been two hundred years
ago. Certainly, at the beginning of the Republic, religious institutions had

21. U.S. CONST. preamble. That organizational reality is illustrated by the other limited
purposes for which the new federal government was "ordained."
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firm charge over education and social services. 22 In many, but not all, of
the colonies, there were official establishments of state churches. 2 No single
theory or pattern predominated. After the revolution, in debates that led to
the Bill of Rights, the first Congress adopted the two religion clauses as
protection for religion, not from religion. 24 That lesson appears to have been
lost on the Supreme Court. 25 The results of this unfortunate departure are
illustrated in the cases. Because the Court treats each religion clause separately, each will be dealt with in turn.
A.

The Establishment Clause

The establishment clause, like its twin the free exercise clause, is fundamentally a political compromise on the appropriate roles of state and church,
each to be secure in its own domain. The secular government protects the
tangible aspects of life and property, and relations between persons as they
affect the common good. Churches exist ultimately for a higher purpose.
The establishment clause preserves this basic distinction, the rationale for
which is documented elsewhere and is not in serious dispute. 26 However, the

22. W. BOWER, CHURCH AND STATE IN EDUCATION 23-24 (1944); B. COUGHLIN, CHURCH
SOCIAL WELFARE (1965); McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment,
1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 420-24.
23. A. RmcHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 115-62 (1985). There was such a wide
diversity of practices that no single state model for the treatment of religion by government
could reasonably have been selected. Virginia and Rhode Island conceded full freedom, while
New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Georgia, North and South Carolina adhered to
religious establishment, and Delaware and Maryland demanded christianity. Four states, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North and South Carolina required assent to the divine inspiration of the
Bible, while Pennsylvania and South Carolina imposed a belief in heaven and hell. New York,
Maryland, and South Carolina excluded ministers from civil office, while Pennsylvania and
South Carolina emphasized belief in one eternal God, and Delaware required assent to the
doctrine of the Trinity. Five states, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland,
and South Carolina insisted on Protestantism. South Carolina still referred to religious "toleration." S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY N AMERICA 507 (1902). The actual clauses
thus removed the matter of religion from the new federal government but preserved it to the
individual and the very separate states. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 730-31 (1789); M. MALBIN,
RELIGION AND POLITICS-THE INTENTION OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16 (1978).
24. 1 A. STOKES, supra note 8. The religion clauses were intended as a complementary
protection for religious liberty, which could not thrive in the absence of some special guarantee
that the government would be separate from the affairs of religion and religion would be
separate from the affairs of the government. L. WHIPPLE, supra note 12, at 63-78.
25. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Most scholars agree that
contemporary construction of the religion clauses dates, not from 1789, but from the 1947
Supreme Court decision in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Johnson, Concepts
and Compromise in the First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 817 n.2
(1984). See infra Part II for a discussion of the development of the intention and values that
inhere in the religion clauses.
26. Both secular and religious writings attest to this reality. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 429-35 (1962). See also E. McDONAGH, supra note 4, at 16. "The American thesis is that
government is not juridically omnipotent. Its powers are limited, and one of the principles of
limitation is the distinction between state and church, in their purposes, methods, and manner
of organization." J. C. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 68.
AND STATE IN
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establishment clause does not embrace any one person's theory of state or
theology. Nor does it express or demand a hermetic separation of the two
domains, 27 which, after all, have much in common.
Over the last forty years, however, religious organizations have seen many
attempts at mutual cooperation with the government rejected by the courts.
In its modern history, the Supreme Court has not always paid adequate
attention to the history of the first amendment as revealed by its political
framers, but instead has given undue weight to imprecise metaphor, and
vague notions of separation of church and state. The Court has struggled
to reconcile a separatist myth with the reality of church/state partnerships
promoting the common good. 28 For the most part, setbacks to mutual
cooperation have occurred in the area of education, 29 but the actual pattern
of gains and losses defies rational explanation.30 Recent evidence of this
pattern is found in Aguilar v. Felton3" and Grand Rapids School District v.
32
Ball, both 1985 Supreme Court decisions.
In two narrow defeats, proponents of cooperative ventures in education,
specifically public involvement in remedial and other nonsectarian education
on the premises of religious schools, lost significant ground. Both decisions
introduced elements into establishment clause jurisprudence that either fundamentally altered the nature of evidence required (making it nearly impossible to prevail) or invited subjective judgments on the quality of links
between public and private institutions serving a mutual public interest. Both
decisions revealed substantial distrust of religious organizations on the part
of some Justices and perhaps a growing movement towards a secular uni-

27. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976).
28. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 294-96 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting argument that the establishment
clause requires reflexive invalidation of every cooperative effort).
29. Edwards v. Aguillard, 428 U.S. 578 (1987); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
30. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, indicated
many examples of unprincipled results:
For example, a State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the
United States for use in geography class. A State may lend textbooks on American
colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George Washington, or a film
projector to show it in history class ....
A State may pay for diagnostic services
conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a
different building; speech and hearing "services" conducted by the State inside the
sectarian school are forbidden ... but the State may conduct speech and hearing
diagnostic testing inside the sectarian school ....
Exceptional parochial school
students may receive counseling, but it must take place outside of the parochial
school, such as in a trailer parked down the street.
Id. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
31. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
32. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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formity in the way that state services are performed. The lower courts may
now routinely find that it does not matter, for establishment clause purposes,
how much good a program does, or that there is no demonstrable constitutional detriment.
The educational program at issue in Aguilar v. Felton was Chapter 1 of
the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 198131 ("Chapter 1").
That Act provides, among other things, that there should be remedial
34
education and mathematics provided for students who are both educationally
and economically disadvantaged." This program, enacted first in 1965 as
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act3 6 ("Title I"), was a
centerpiece of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society program. For
nineteen years, the program functioned on the premises of both public and
private schools. It was a public program, never part of the curriculum of
private schools, and was expressly found by the Congress to be an aid to
students, not to the schools.37 Several times a week, public school teachers,
retained specifically to teach remedial courses, would instruct those, who
had been tested as educationally deprived, in schools throughout the country.
The challenge had been filed in 1978 to the New York City program which
had the largest Chapter 1 (then Title I) program in the country.3" That case
was brought before a three-judge court which had ruled the program was
constitutional. 9 In a subsequent lawsuit, before a single United States district
judge, the program was likewise upheld. The judge could find no evidence
based on an extensive record and after extensive discovery that the Chapter
1 program violated the Constitution.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
invalidated the program on grounds of entanglement. 4 0 The court was concerned that the Chapter 1 program would require extensive monitoring
between public school supervisors and private school employees about the
contents of the Chapter 1 program in order to assure that there was no
violation of the establishment clause.41 As outrageous as it might sound to
a nonlegal ear, the court was concerned that public school teachers hired
for the express purpose of teaching remedial English and mathematics to

33. 20 U.S.C. § 3801-3876 (1981). The challenge subsumed both the current and the identical
predecessor statute.
34. 20 U.S.C. § 3804(a) (Supp. III 1985).
35. Id. § 3805(b).
36. Id. § 2701-92 (1982).
37. S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 12 (1965).
38. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 407 (1985).
39. See also National Coalition for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F.
Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (affirming the same challenge to the Title I program). Counsel for
plaintiffs in National Coalition, Leo Pfeffer, failed to perfect his appeal in the United States

Supreme Court on time and the Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 449 U.S. 808 (1980).
40. Felton v. Department of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom.

Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
41. 739 F.2d at 65-68.
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educationally disadvantaged children could somehow also espouse religious
doctrine, thereby channeling state money for religious education, unless they
were scrupulously and thus unconstitutionally supervised. 42 An appeal was
43
lodged with the Supreme Court.
In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball," there were two community
programs at issue. First, a Shared Time program, involving supplementary
remedial education for school children and second, a Community Education
program, involving extra curricular community courses for children and
adults alike. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had little trouble finding
that the publicly funded Community Education program, which included
various arts and humanities courses taught before and after school to private
school students, violated the Constitution. It found that this was a channel
for public money to private schools to supplement the curriculum of the
private schools.4 5 Given the Supreme Court's disposition of other education
cases, it might have been foreseeable that the Community Education program
would be held invalid." Unfortunately, the Shared Time remedial education
programs also suffered the same fate. Both Aguilar and Grand Rapids were
argued together before the Supreme Court in 1984.
On July 1, 1985, in two 5-4 decisions, the Supreme Court invalidated
Aquilar's Chapter 1 program and struck down Grand Rapids' education
programs for assisting private students with public funds. In Aguilar, the
Court found that it did not matter that the record did not reveal a single
instance in which there were actual violations of any funding restrictions
involving public school teachers on private school premises. The Court found
that the burden was on the state to prove that such violations would never
happen. It found that the state could not prove that such violations would
never happen unless it conducted massive surveillance, a presence the Court
found would excessively entangle church and state. 47 The Court was concerned that the presence of public employees in a pervasive religious environment would lead, over time, to a subversion of the public character of
4
the program and lead, inevitably, to misuse of public funds. 1

42. Indeed, the court conceded the program had done "much good and little, if any,
detectable harm." Id. at 72.
43. 469 U.S. 878 (1984). The Court postponed jurisdiction for consideration of the merits.
On the merits, the Court rejected the argument for appellate jurisdiction but nonetheless treated
the jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari granted it and proceeded to the
merits. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408 & n.7 (1985).
44. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
45. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids,
718 F.2d 1389, 1404-05 (6th Cir. 198 ), aff'd sub nom. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 396-97 (1985).
46. 473 U.S. at 395-97.
47. Id. at 412-13.
48. Id. To be fair, the Court was concerned that there would be no way in which an actual
violation of the program conditions would come to the attention of state authorities.
In Grand Rapids, the Court concluded that parents and students would have no incentive to
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The same fate befell the Grand Rapids education programs. 49 The Com-

munity Education program lost by a larger margin under more traditional
Court doctrine.50 The majority, however, invalidated the Shared Time remedial education program in a 5-4 vote by introducing the concept of

"symbolic union" between church and state due to the presence of public
employees on private premises. 5 "Symbolic union," undefined and unlimited, could provide a handy excuse for judges in trying to invalidate church/
state cooperation. Because the Supreme Court did not give the parameters
of, or indicate an objective measure for the concept, it has now introduced
a subjective element into an area of law that has already been substantially
confused over time.5 2 In these cases, overreaching legal theory, uninformed

report public school teachers who were involved in the advancement of religious teaching in
the course of remedial mathematics. Because of the significant degree of autonomy of the
teachers, it was likely that, absent massive surveillance, actual violations could go unnoticed
for some long period of time. 473 U.S. at 388-89.
On the other hand, one would have thought that in a program involving thousands of
children, and given the attention to the program for nearly ten years of litigation, some problems
would have come to light that would require the attention of state authorities. Not a single
instance, however, was documented. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 424 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49. 473 U.S. 373. Both remedial education programs lost by 5-4 margins. In her dissenting
opinion, Justice O'Connor pointedly expressed concern for the educational needs of the children
and the way that the record had not shown any unconstitutionality. Id. at 398-99. In the
absence of some actual detriment or other evidence of harm, Justice O'Connor voted to sustain
the program believing that the constitutional infirmity alleged was particularly weak and that
any benefits to religion indirect. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 421-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50. The vote was 7-2 with only Justices Rehnquist and White voting for the program. Grand
Rapids, 473 U.S. at 400-01.
51. Id. at 389-90. The Court was concerned that the challenged action was likely to be
perceived by adherents as an endorsement and by nonadherents as a disapproval of individual
religious choice. Id. at 390.
52. Id. at 401 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court claims to use an objective
test for determining violations of the establishment clause. The test minted in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and appropriately styled the "Lemon" test, has three parts.
A law must: (I) have a secular purpose; (2) neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) not
excessively entangle church and state. Id. at 612-13.
First, to determine a secular purpose, the Court often defers to the findings and purposes of
the statute. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 416 (Powell, J., concurring). In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court
departed from the test of deferring to the findings and purposes of the statute and looked to
the views of the principal sponsor to determine that the Moment of Silence Law in Alabama
had a religious purpose. 472 U.S. 38, 56-58 (1985). Detailed criticism of this jurisprudential
departure is beyond the scope of the Article.
Second, to determine whether there is advancement of religion the Court has required that
any such advancement be direct and material, not indirect and insubstantial. Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984).

Finally, excessive entanglement is the closest element of the three to a subjective test. It
invites a court to look at the actual state of relations between the religious and the public
institutions and determine whether it offends the court's sense of balance and separation.
Since its beginning, many members of the Supreme Court have urged that the Lemon test
be abandoned or modified. Beginning in Lemon itself, Justice White criticized the excessive
entanglement prong of the test on the grounds that it creates an "insoluble paradox." Lemon,
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by any consideration of the social good to be achieved, led to the invalidation

of significant and effective social programs. These cases set the stage for
other setbacks for religious organizations in other pursuits, notably the
district court 1987 decision in Bowen v. Kendrick" and recent actions
invalidating alternative programs designed to cope with the disruption in
54
remedial education caused by Aguilar.

In 1988, the Supreme Court solidified the laws in the educational areas,
and at the same time permitted religious institutional participation in social
services programs. In Bowen v. Kendrick," the particular challenge was to
the participation of religious organizations in the Adolescent Family Life

Act.56 That program invited demonstration projects and services grants from
a broad spectrum of community services, expressly including religious services
"as appropriate."" In a 5-4 decision, the Court, reversing the district court,
found that the choice to include the religious organizations by Congress was

not unreasonable or unconstitutional." The Court found that Congress was
within its constitutional discretion to decide that religious organizations could

have something meaningful to say and therefore could play a role in the
development of services towards adolescents.5 9 Charges that the program was

403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., dissenting in part). In her concurrence in Wallace, Justice O'Connor
noted that the Lemon test "should be reexamined and refined .. .to make [it] more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the first amendment." 472 U.S. at 68-70 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Wallace, sharply criticized each prong of the
Lemon test, and highlighted its paradoxical results. Id. at 110-11 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
Justice Scalia has also criticized the Lemon test. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 61319 (1987). So far, the Court has been unable or unwilling to find an alternative that satisfies
its own needs.
53. 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 108 S.Ct. 2562 (1988). The
case is now on remand in the United States District Court. See infra note 61.
54. Congress, concerned about the detrimental affect of the Aguilar decision on the education
of children most in need of such services, enacted remedial legislation to offset the impact.
Congress provided that capital costs for moving the Chapter 1 program off premises could be
separately funded from the state share prior to the allocation of monies on a per pupil basis
between public and private schools. 20 U.S.C. § 2727(a) (Supp. III 1985). A number of school
districts also began the rental or purchase of vans in order to move the program off the premise
of a private schools. In Pulido v. Cavazos, the district court, which had previously heard
Wamble v. Bell, 598 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mo. 1984), invalidated both the method of cost
allocation in the post-Aguilar Chapter 1 program and the location of vans on school yards,
even in places remote from the private school. Pulido, 788 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mo. 1989). By
contrast, in Barnes v. Cavazos, the U.S. District Court in Louisville, Kentucky upheld the van
delivery of services but invalidated the method of cost allocation. Barnes v. Cavazos, No. C800501-L(A) (W.D. Ky. February 21, 1990). Both cases now mark the beginning of another cycle
of education litigation heading ultimately for the Supreme Court.
55. 108 S.Ct. 2562 (1988).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
57. Id. § 300Z(a)(8)(B).
58. 108 S.Ct. at 2579.
59. Unfortunately, as a way of drafting the opinion, the majority expressly distinguished
Aguilar from Bowen and implicitly endorsed the rationale of the Aguilar and Grand Rapids
cases. This was certainly a surprising result given that the Chief Justice who authored Bowen
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such that it invited abusive
being administered in an unconstitutional way
61
6
were brushed off with a remand.
practicesw
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, one of the
most puzzling and divisive opinions of the last few years, the Supreme Court
invalidated the display of the creche at the county courthouse in Pittsburgh
at the same time it upheld a display of a menorah next to a Christmas tree
at the city/county building. 62 The actual division of the Court ruled 6-3 in
favor of the menorah at the city/county building and 5-4 against the creche
at the county courthouse. 63 The language of the Court in dealing with these
issues, however, reveals a deep and perhaps untractable division on the role
of religion in our society and the proper ways in which the courts might
adjudicate these issues. For example, Justice Blackmun, writing for the
plurality and joined only by Justice Stevens, found that a test articulated in
a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly6 was the
proper means for determining establishment clause cases. 65 Lynch, a 5-4

was one of the leading dissenters in Aguilar and Grand Rapids. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at 2576,
2578.
60. Id. at 2580.
61. This case continues, on remand, in the U.S. district court. In order to remand the case,
the Court endorsed a broad view of taxpayer standing for establishment clause purposes. The
Court upheld standing because the plaintiffs were challenging congressional action under the
taxing and spending power as opposed to Valley Forge v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464
(1982), which involved a challenge to executive action. The Court found that the relationship
between the statute authorizing participation of religious groups and the actual administration
of the program was so close that the taxpayer standing was justified. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. at
2579-80.
Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion suggested that, on remand, it was still possible
for the plaintiffs to prevail if they could show that either particular institutions themselves were
so pervasively sectarian or the pattern of abuses was so rampant that the program was impossible
to administer. Id. at 2581-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She neither ruled that "pervasively
sectarian" institutions were disqualified per se nor expressed an opinion on the conduct of
grantees. In either case, she directed that relief should be directed specifically to grantees and
not to the AFLA itself. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, found that the character of
the institution should not matter. In his view, what should matter is what the institution did
with the money. Id. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Motivation for performing a ministry
seemed to be less important than its actual conduct. Id. at 2582. See infra Part III.
62. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
63. Id. at 3092-93. In numerous separate opinions, the actual split of the Court is difficult
to follow. However, the display of the menorah was supported by Justice Kennedy, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and White, with separate opinions by Justice O'Connor
and Justice Blackmun. The invalidation of the display of the creche is found in the joining of
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, in their separate opinions, with the opinion of Justice
Brennan joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens.
64. 465 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3102. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Lynch,
articulated that the test is whether the particular item of contest would send a message "to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
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decision, upheld the inclusion of a creche in the city of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island Christmas display in a private park.66 Interestingly, in Allegheny,
Justice Blackmun, a dissenter in Lynch, adopted the reasoning of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence along with the four dissents in Lynch. 6 This reasoning would have had the effect of implicitly rewriting the holding in Lynch
(supported by Justice O'Connor's vote) that actually upheld the display. In
Allegheny, Justice Blackmun, like Justice O'Connor, again concurring, agreed
that the religious significance of the menorah in the city/county building
was muted by the presence of what they considered a secular symbol-the
Christmas tree-which conveyed the message that this was a traditional and
secular celebration of the holiday season. 68 In Justice O'Connor's words,
"the city ... conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of belief during
the holiday season," ' 69 the inference being that a solely religious message,
even though communicated by nongovernmental and religious entities in a
public park, would be invalid. Because the creche stood alone on the steps
of the courthouse, the creche display violated the establishment clause because it conveyed a message of endorsement based on the Christian celebration of Christmas. Alone and unadorned, the Court found that in this case
the display lacked a secular aspect which permitted the display of the creche
in Pawtucket, and unfortunately doomed it in Pittsburgh.
This result, not surprisingly, drew sharp dissent, this time from Justice
Kennedy, writing in his first major church/state decision.70 Justice Kennedy
found that both displays of the menorah and creche placed the city and the
county merely behind seasonal celebrations and acknowledged the "historical
background and religious as well as secular nature of the Chanukah and
Christmas holidays." 71 He found that enforced recognition of only the secular
would indicate a callous indifference and hostility towards religious faith
that history and tradition do not require.7 2 In Justice Kennedy's view, there
was no realistic "risk" that the display of the creche or the menorah placed
the power of government behind a religious celebration that would therefore
have the effect of coercing citizens into accepting it as an integral part of
73
their civic experience.

66. Id. at 672.
67. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3103 (opinion joined only by Justice Stevens).
68. Id. at 3122.
69. Id. at 3123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 3134 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 3138 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 3135. Justice Kennedy would adopt a test that would require an evaluation of
whether there was an intent to proselytize in order to support a judgment of invalidity. Id. He
found that the government may not coerce people to support a participating religion or its
exercise or give direct benefits to religion to such a degree that it establishes a religion. In the
absence of such findings, there would be no establishment of religion. For his part, the Lemon
formulation does not "require a relentless extirpation of all contact between government and
religion." Id. He, therefore, joined the criticism of the Lemon test. Id. at 3134.
73. Id. at 3139.
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The evident confusion and deep division of the Court makes it difficult
to predict the nature of establishment clause jurisprudence for the future.
Some things, however, seem certain. The burden will be on the proponents
of religious exercise or the supporters of religious institutions, and not on
those attacking a particular program, to justify its constitutionality. The
Court has apparently reversed the standard of proof. 74 Efforts to provide a
more objective test or some evidence of a concrete violation of religious
liberty in order to sustain a finding of invalidity do not seem to command
a majority on the Court. Because the numerous mutual cooperations between
church and state find their validation not in public benefit but in judicial
inquiry, rooted in the Court's somewhat "separatist" view of the establishment clause, this observation may be of particular significance for the future.
One issue that is particularly implicated-and disturbing-in the establishment clause cases, especially after Allegheny, is the issue of fair participation.
Bowen stands for the proposition that it is unfair to exclude religious
organizations from broad-based social services programs. Churches and other
religious institutions have a role to play in these programs, and the Constitution does not stand as a bar, on its face, to their participation in these
programs. With respect to other aspects of religious expression, even the
display of religious programs in public parks, one would think that the
participation of religious institutions in these programs should be on equal
footing with other institutions. For example, if a state makes park space
available to all comers on a permit basis, it is unjust (and illegal) for them
to exclude religious programs based on the content of the display. 7 Unfortunately, fairness has its limits, and an appeal to the equity of the situation
is not necessarily a guarantor that justice will be done.76 The purpose of this
Article is to begin to address that situation through the development of new
processes and enhancement of new considerations.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
No one disputes that the free exercise clause protects religious liberty.
Where we divide is over the meaning of "liberty. ' 77 As Justice Cardozo
commented:
74. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
75. O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (permit for Papal Mass on National
Mall); Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (creche in annual Pageant of Peace).
76. This point is more than amply illustrated by Doe v. Small, a recent district court
decision, invalidating the display of a privately-owned and maintained religious portraits in a
public park on a permit basis during the holiday season. 726 F. Supp. 713, 714 (N.D. Ill.
1989). The court put particular emphasis on the fact that the display during the holiday season
was one of the few displays in that park and that the painting seemed to be displayed for much
longer than the holiday season, except for those seasons during which the city council was
intimidated by the threat of litigation. Id. at 717-18. This case is a rather unfortunate departure
from the basic principle that fairness and justice should guide the course of adjudication. See
Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989) (display of menorah in park on a
permit basis invalid; court declined to follow rule of McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.
1984), aff'd by an equally divided court, 471 U.S. 83 (1985) after Allegheny).

77. As Abraham Lincoln once said: "The world has never had a good definition of the
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Liberty as a legal concept contains an underlying paradox. Liberty in the
most literal sense is the negation of law, for law is restraint, and the
absence of restraint is anarchy. On the other hand, anarchy by destroying
restraint would leave liberty the exclusive possession of the strong or the
unscrupulous. 'This is a world of compensation,' said Lincoln, 'and he
who would be no
slave must consent to have no slave.' So once more we
7
face a paradox.

1

The plain meaning of this statement is the essence of political compromise.
The problem is that the sense of balance and compromise is absent from
the Court's most recent pronouncements on free exercise.
In 1988, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,7 9
the Supreme Court confirmed that the free exercise clause has substantial
limits, notwithstanding that it is cast in absolute terms.8 0 In Lyng, the federal
government insisted on its right to build a highway through federal land
that had been used for many centuries as a sacred ritual ground of a particular
American Indian tribe. The majority said,
[E]ven if we assume that ... [the highway] will 'virtually destroy the
Indians' ability to practice their religion,' . . . the Constitution simply
does not provide a principle that could justify upholding [the Indians']
legal claims. However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every
citizen's religious needs and desires."

The rights of believers to insist that the government adjust its practices to
accommodate their religious practices have been limited. 2 What is remarkable
for religious organizations is that individuals and their religious groups may
not insist that the government take additional steps to accommodate or
protect their religious practices. Thus, presumably, government could pass
a facially neutral law offensive to Catholic values and practices and Catholics
might not be able to resist the law successfully under the free exercise

word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for
liberty: but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing."
A. Lincoln, Address at Sanitary Fair (April 18, 1864). Mr. Lincoln is right. We all speak
the same words but we do not mean the same things. Therein lie the roots of the conflict
between church and state.
78. B. CARDozo, Ti
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LEOAL SCIENCE 94 (1928) (footnote omitted).

79. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
80. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
81. 485 U.S. at 451-52. This case continued a trend subordinating claims of individuals and
groups to government institutional concerns. E.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986)
(federal statute requiring use of social security number did not violate Indian religious rights);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (Air Force allowed to prohibit yarmulke
worn with uniform).
82. There were weaknesses with respect to both the factual record and the litigation strategy,
for example, in that the native Americans often allowed non-native Americans onto their sacred
lands for hiking, camping, and other recreational purposes. 485 U.S. at 452. Particular uses of
tribal land tended to undercut the claimed sacredness of the land to the native Americans with
respect to uniqueness and privacy that must be accorded their religious practices. Id.
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clause.83 Catholics, like other religious groups who are sometimes in and
sometimes out of the mainstream of American life, could not insist that
certain accommodations be made either in theory or in practice.
The United States has argued continually over the last few Supreme Court
terms that the free exercise clause is limited to the protection of an individual's liberty. The government claims that a religious organization may not
exercise rights protectable to that organization (as distinguished from individual members) under the free exercise clause. This argument is based on
somewhat doubtful constitutional grounds,8 4 and it has recently been rejected
by a court of appeals reviewing the surveillance of religious exercises by
government agents and the consequent damage to religious organizations
(but not necessarily individuals) at the hands of Immigration and Naturalization Service agents." The Supreme Court has not squarely faced what
would seem to be an obvious facet of the freedom of religion protected
under the free exercise clause. 86 As one commentator recently said:
We live in a regime that, for better or for worse, has subordinated
meaningful religious freedom to the moral sovereignty of politics. The
Amish and other quaint dissenters provide a useful promotional service
for the regime, for they permit us, through their differentness and occasional court victory, to pretend otherwise.7

In contrast to earlier cases broadening protection for religious groups against
government regulation, 8 free exercise has been somewhat diminished as a
broad guarantee for the protection of religion.

83. One example of such a law might be the employer sanctions aspects of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (Supp. IV 1986). The Act requires that all
employers verify the citizenship of prospective employees or face substantial fines and penalties.
Id. § 1324(a). That demand, placed on employers contrasts directly with, for example, the views
expressed by the Bishops of the United States and others with deep roots in Catholic doctrine
that one may not make distinctions among those who need employment based on alienage or
even based on the artificiality of political boundaries. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, POLICY STATEMENT EMPLOYER SANCTIONS (1988). Nonetheless, the affirmative challenge

based on the free exercise clause becomes problematic given the existence of this case law. See
infra note 107 for a discussion of American Friends Service Committee v. Thornburgh, 718 F.
Supp. 820 (C.D. Cal. 1989). On the other hand, if there is a challenge by the United States to
the activities of a Catholic employer, that employer might legitimately object on constitutional
grounds. But see Employment Division v. Smith, I10 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
84. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (I Wall.) 679 (1871) (court endorsed broad protection
for churches as churches in certain matters). Recently, the Court implicitly confirmed the free
exercise clause as a foundation for this protection. Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
at 1601. The Court also recognized a link between individual free exercise rights and a right
of association. Id. at 1602 (citing, Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1983)).
85. Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989).
86. But see Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 679 (1871). See also Employment Division
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
87. Bradley, Developments in Church-State Law: Analysis and Opinion, 77 ILL. B.J. 806,
812 (1989).
88. For example, the Supreme Court stood firmly against efforts to regulate the proselytizing
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In 1990, the Supreme Court confirmed suspicions that it was willing to
place substantial limits on free exercise clause arguments. In a case brought
by the California Board of Equalization to tax the sales of religious goods
of the Swaggart Ministries in California, the Court unanimously ruled that
the free exercise clause did not provide a bar to the imposition of sales and
use tax. 9 In fact, the Court did not pause for any great deliberations on
the meaning of the free exercise clause. Indeed, to this observer, it is
remarkable that not a single Justice thought the argument was worth considerable weight. In that case, the California taxing authority imposed substantial tax penalties on Swaggart Ministries after its evangelistic crusades in
California. Swaggart Ministries had maintained an extensive interstate sale
of religious articles, part of which obviously was conducted with customers
in California.90 Separating out the religious from the nonreligious, the Swaggart Ministries argued that it was simply unconstitutional for the state to
place any tax burden on their ability to evangelize in California, attempting
to find support in the cases in which cities have attempted to license street
ministers as a condition to their selling religious tracts on street corners.
In those cases, 9' the Court found the imposition of a license acted as a
prior restraint of free exercise and was therefore unconstitutional. In Swaggart Ministries, the Court distinguished the sales and use tax from a license.
A license is a precondition for a religious organization to exercise its ministry;
sales and use taxes were the consequence of engaging in an activity, religious
or otherwise, in society. 92 The Court was not persuaded that sales and use
taxes burdened the exercise of the ministry and could arguably dissuade
people from partaking of its benefits:
California's generally applicable sales and use tax is not a flat tax, represents only a small fraction of any retail sale, and applies neutrally to all
retail sales of tangible personal property made in California. California
imposes its sales and use tax even if the seller or the purchaser is charitable,
religious, nonprofit, or state or local governmental in nature. Thus, the
sales and use tax is not a tax on the right to disseminate religious infor-

of the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1940's. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73
(1951) (local officials denial of public park to Jehovah's Witnesses because of officials' dislike
of them was unconstitutional). These decisions form part of a consistent line of cases rejecting
discrimination in public benefits or privileges on account of religion, recently affirmed in Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1987), and Frazee v. Illinois Dep't
of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (1989).
89. Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990).
90. Id. at 692.
91. See supra note 88.
92. 110 S. Ct. at 696. Of course, part of the absence of "appeal" lies in the ready ability
of Swaggart Ministries to distinguish between religious and arguably nonreligious articles that
it was offering for sale in conjunction with its ministry. The ability to distinguish such articles
undercut the argument that the imposition of tax was a great burden on the exercise of religion
or otherwise invited the State to engage in an exercise of determining which articles were
religious and which articles were not. Id. at 697-99.
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mation, ideas, or beliefs per se; rather, it is a tax on the privilege of
making retail sales of tangible personal property and on the storage, use,
or other consumption of tangible personal property in California. For
example, California treats the sale of a bible by a religious organization
just as it would treat the sale of a bible by a bookstore; as long as both
are in-state retail sales of tangible personal property, they are both subject
to the tax regardless of the motivation for the sale of the purchase. There
is no danger that appellant's religious activity is being singled out for
special and burdensome treatment. 9

The Court confirms for the first time that the existence of a tax exemption
is largely a matter of legislative or administrative grace.4 Churches may not
insist on an exemption from a facially neutral, broadly applicable law because
it might arguably interfere with their practice of religion. Although the Court
reserves for a future date whether there might exist some particular egregious
case in which the taxing authority is either imposed for discriminatory intent
or has discriminatory effect, 9 the Court is persuaded that absent those
circumstances, there is no reasonable basis for giving credence to the free
exercise argument.
In April, 1990, the Supreme Court went further in a case which some
observers did not think would demonstrably affect the interest of institutional
religion. 96 In that case, two drug rehabilitation counselors had been discharged for their use of the drug peyote in a ceremony of their Native
American religion. They defended their disqualification for unemployment
compensation on the grounds that, notwithstanding the state's criminalization
of the use of the drug, there were overriding constitutional implications that
justified their entitlement to unemployment benefits. 97 Before the United
States Supreme Court the claimants argued that the criminal prohibition on
the religious use of peyote was unconstitutional under the free exercise clause.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that absent an intention to single out
religion for adverse treatment, a free exercise clause claim would not be
allowed to override a neutral statute, otherwise constitutional when applied
to nonreligious conduct. The Court found reasoning for its result in the
"text" of the free exercise clause:

93. Id. at 695-96 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 696-97, 698.
95. Id. at 699-700.
96. Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).

97. Relying on the line of Supreme Court cases in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
and other cases, supra note 88, the Oregon State Supreme Court reversed their disqualification
based on the exercise of protected religious practices. In the United States Supreme Court, on
initial appeal, the Court noted that given the state's apparent willingness to criminalize the use
of peyote even for religious purposes, it could certainly impose a lesser burden of denying
unemployment compensation. Employment Division v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988). On
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the religious use of peyote fell within the
proscription of the Oregon drug control statutes but invalidated the prohibition under the free
exercise clause. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed.

19901

A PLEA FOR CONSISTENCY

1161

It is a permissible reading of the text, . . . to say that if prohibiting the
exercise of religion (or burdening the activity . . .) is not the object of the
[law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.98
The majority diminished protection for free exercise by noting that, in
those cases in which the Court has sustained a religious exercise challenge
to a state's statute of general applicability, the claim for constitutional
protection of religious liberty was coupled with some other constitutional
right, such as freedom of speech or the rights of parents to direct the
education of their children. 99 Because the case here presented a bare claim
of religious discrimination under the free exercise clause without any contention that this was either an attempt to "regulate religious beliefs, the
communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those
beliefs",/° the free exercise clause offered no protection. Moreover, except
in those cases involving the denial of state unemployment benefits (under
statutes already providing exception) or regulation aimed at religion as
religion, the Court declined, both in this case and for future cases, to apply
any compelling state interest test to balance the asserted religious infringement.101 Perhaps the key to the harshness of the majority opinion lies in the
fact that this conduct was criminalized and therefore worthy of higher
concern by the Court. 20 If not, then religious rights can be expected to be
routinely subverted. 03 Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but on
the narrow grounds that the state statute criminalizing the conduct gave
sufficient answer to the constitutional question presented in this case. Joined
by the three dissenters, she was sharply critical of the Court's abandonment
of "our long history of Free Exercise precedents.' °4 In her view, the finding
that religious practice has been burdened by a law, whether particularly
directed at religious conduct or of otherwise general applicability, only meant
that a reviewing court was required to go further in order to protect a
constitutional right:

98. 110 S. Ct. at 1600. The Court relied on Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940) as support for that proposition, without noting that the opinion had been overturned
three years later in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
99. 110 S. Ct. at 1600. In this way, the Court further distinguished Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
100. 110 S. Ct. at 1600-01.
101. Id.
102. Indeed, the Court has perhaps found in free exercise cases a rule which it now applies
in establishment clause cases. In establishment clause cases, a law does not have a "primary
effect" of advancing religion if it only provides an incidental benefit to religion. Similarly, now
in free exercise cases after Smith, the Court finds that incidental effects on religious practices
do not warrant a higher level of scrutiny by the Court.
103. In Townley Engineering v. EEOC, 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), Judge Noonan in
dissent notes the same point-whatever interest is advanced by the state is routinely compelling
and of greater weight than the religious infringement. Id. at 622-25 (Norman, J., dissenting).
104. 110 S. Ct. at 1608.
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The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment's command
that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred
position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this
liberty whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling
governmental interests 'of the highest order', Yoder, [406 U.S.] at 215.101
Indeed, she found in Yoder that the Court had expressly rejected the
interpretation the majority now adopted.'0 6 Without citation, the Court
majority arguably extended its line of reasoning in Swaggart Ministries,
extending its prohibition on affirmative challenges to generally applicable
laws to defenses to the enforcement of those laws to particular conduct.
Whether this decision portends some new day for the Court's jurisprudence
must await further cases. Yet, it does not ring well with either the text or
history of the religion clauses.
For these reasons, litigation to advance religious participation in public
life into the 1990's is risky. 1°7 Certainly, public policy will be made in the
courts and the religious organizations need to be involved in those proceedings. Yet, unlike the legislative or the executive branches where compromise
is possible, courts do not provide such a luxury: there will always be winners
and losers. More often than not, under the current state of the law, religious
organizations have much more to lose than to gain by affirmative resort to
judicial remedies under the free exercise clause. 08

II.

THE SEARCH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

The writers of the Constitution intended balance in the development and
implementation of the constitutional text. They balanced both individual and
institutional concerns. Plainly, they protected personal choice and practices.
But they also protected institutional autonomy between churches and the
state, and did not intend the subservience of one institution to the other. In
fact, within its "precincts," each was considered supreme.2 9 For this reason,

105. Id. at 1609.
106. Id. at 1609-10.
107. See supra note 83. There, it is indicated that an affirmative challenge to the employer
sanctions law has proved to be difficult. A district court in California, for example, not only
rejected such a challenge but held, as a matter of law, that the assertion of a free exercise
interest could never be of sufficient weight to warrant an exemption given the government's
interest in maintaining the security of the borders. American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 718 F. Supp. 820, 822 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
108. Justice Holmes once said "the law must be stable but must not stand still." This maxim
accurately describes the means by which the law changes incrementally in the court system.
Even the victories when won will likely be small and narrow. Courts are supposed to exist to
right wrongs and to give remedies, not to adjust the law to prevailing social conditions. A
strategy whereby the formation or reformation of public policy is made primarily in the judicial
system is, therefore, inherently risky. Especially given the Court's pronouncements in Swaggart
Ministries and Smith, the legal resources of religious organizations are best expanded primarily
in assisting the religious organizations in the formation of public policy, and in the judicial
system to protect hard won gains.
109. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
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the civil courts have rules of deference to the adjudication of uniquely
ecclesiastical disputes." 0 Also for this reason, churches may not exercise a
veto over legitimate state functions."' Yet, the interactions between public
institutions and religious institutions are numerous. Because of the development of the case law, and the enhancement of the standard of the
perception of endorsement, there are substantial risks to these cooperative
efforts, as discussed above. It is equally clear, however, that government
action which happens to coincide with religious values is not a violation of
the religion clauses." '2 Nonetheless, every coincidence between governmental
action and religious value is likely to rankle some citizen who does not share
that view and may quite honestly "feel" some denigration on this basis. If
endorsement analysis is the law based on "perceptions," it invites mischief
that could have grave consequences for the public interest."' For this reason,
renewed consideration of the intentional values that inhere in the constitutional text and the ways in which the constitutional text was intended to
serve the public interest is required.
This having been said, this Article does not intend for either strict construction of the text, rooted in words and phrases and legislative history,
nor does it require a loose interpretation based on a sense of the demands
of contemporary times. Both views have their supporters." 4 This Article is
not among them. Strict construction of the text requires too rigid an adherence to words, laden with a particular meaning and in a particular context
which may, in some instances, have outlived their literal usefulness. The
development of the death penalty jurisprudence is one important and useful
example." 5 Vague interpretation based on some sense of current needs is

110. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 706-09 (1976).
111. Larkin v. Grendal's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 121-22 (1982).
112. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313
(1952) (noting desired conformance between public function in accommodation to religious
needs).
113. As one commentator has stated:
"Endorsement" analysis is a pipedream, not because government never "endorses"
religion but because it inevitably does do. Like it or not, the nature of governmental
action is to take stands that will rankle some (or many, or most) citizens because
of the citizens' religious scruples. Just ask pacifists about how much an "insider"
they felt during the Vietnam War. Or about their taxes, roughly one-third of which
go for instruments of mass violence. Ask "pro-lifers" about their discomfort with
our constitutional order.
Bradley, supra note 87, at 808.
Some of the plaintiffs in Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. 970, 972
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) felt "denigrated" by claimed preferential treatment of Catholic bishops by the
taxing authorities and felt further compelled to sue to revoke the Church's tax exemption. The
challenge was recently and correctly dismissed for lack of standing. In re United States Catholic
Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3693 (U.S. April 30,

1990).
114. Much of the argumentation and some of the authorities are found in Wachtler, Our
Constitutions-Alive and Well, 61 ST, JoHN's L. REV. 381 (1987).
115. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), reflects colonial practice which imposed
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equally invalid, for it lacks the sense of roots in the Constitution required
for authentic interpretation. Some middle ground must be found, and this
Article endeavors to give it substance.
A.

Personal Liberty and Institutional Integrity as Touchstone Values

Despite the Supreme Court's regular insistence that the history of the first
amendment aids interpretation of the religion clauses,' 16 the sole historical
underpinning in many lengthy opinions is often contained in one brief
reference to Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" between church and
state." 7 Whatever efficacy Jefferson's statement had in establishment clause
analysis, it was thoroughly discredited by Chief Justice Rehnquist's scholarly
' 8
dissertation on the history of the first amendment in Wallace v. Jaffree. 1
As explained therein, the wall has become a "blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier" which "is not wholly accurate" and can only be "dimly perceived."" ' 9 "The concept of a 'wall' of separation is a useful figure of speech
... [b]ut the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the
practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and
state."' 10 Much is made of the central role played by Jefferson and others,
and much is attributed to their metaphorical descriptions. History is much
more illuminating.
If anything, Jefferson's view of religion and the state was one in which
religion played a central role in the order of society. Although Jefferson
supported the disestablishment of a central religion, he and other founders
believed that the interaction of religion and state brought about and preserved
certain moral values essential to civil government. Mr. Jefferson, like others
of his contemporaries, believed that religion was important in the public and
private lives of the citizens of the state. 2 ' Among other things, he introduced

the death penalty in rejecting Eighth Amendment challenges, Yet it allows for consideration of
"evolving standards of decency." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
116. E.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 605-08 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-76 (1984); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437-41 (1961).
117. See McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 244 n.8 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting)
(quoting 1802 Letter to Danbury Baptist Churches in 8 TtE WRrrmos OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
113 (Washington ed., 1861)).
118. 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 112. At best, this Court considered the wall of separation little more than a
"useful signpost" on the road to legitimate establishment clause analysis. Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982). But more signposts, providing additional guidance, are surely
needed on a road that "has become 'as winding as the famous serpentine wall' [Jefferson]
designed for the University of Virginia." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 761 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948)). As Justice Douglas, writing
for the Court in Zorach v. Clauson, stated: "The First Amendment, however, does not say
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State." 343 U.S. 306,
312 (1952).
120. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673.
121.

PROCEEDINGS, EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY, CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS

79 (1981).

19901

A PLEA FOR CONSISTENCY

1165

bills to promote rest on the Sabbath as part of the religious duty that man
owed to God.' 22 Jefferson was President when tax exemption was first given
to churches in Washington. 123 He recommended that various religious sects
be allowed to establish schools of theology in Virginia's public university
124
and recognized the public good in continuation of sectarian orphanages.
If one should look to Jefferson, his actions are far more meaningful than
his metaphor.
The history of the drafting and negotiations that led to the wording of
the religion clauses as finally adopted by the First Congress is detailed by
the Chief Justice in Wallace v. Jaffree.125 The generative process of extensive
compromise that resulted in the establishment clause shows that it had two
purposes: first, to prevent Congress from establishing or favoring a national
religion; and, second, to prevent Congress from interfering with the states'
policies with regard to religion. 26 The phrase "respecting an establishment"
did not mean merely concerning or touching upon religion. Indeed, Representative Livermore of New Hampshire had proposed such language in the
House of Representatives on August 15, 1789, and his proposal was rejected.1 27 As the Chief Justice pointed out in Wallace v. Jaffree: "In]one of
the other Members of Congress who spoke during the August 15th debate
expressed the slightest indication that they thought the language before them
from the Select Committee, or the evil to be aimed at, would require the
1 2
Government to be absolutely neutral as between religion and irreligion."
There is nothing in the records of the First Congress to indicate that the use
of the word "respecting" was in any way intended to alter the meaning of
29
an established religion as being a national religion.1

122. A thorough discussion of Jefferson's public life is in R. CoRD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
STATE: HisToRIcAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 41-46, 261-63 (1982). See also McCollum

AND

v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 244-47 (1948). Mr. Cord also reviews the impact of Madison
and others on the formulation of the religion clauses. The key point for understanding them
is that the practices of no single state or no one framer dominated. The First Congress was
fraught with compromise and the religion clauses were forged in that political furnace where
individual differences are melted and blended to form the public's interest.
123. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 684 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
124. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 245-46 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
125. 472 U.S. at 92-98. As amicus curiae, the United States Catholic Conference reviewed
the history of the establishment clause in, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399-402 (1983);
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 621 (1986).
126. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 730-31 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789); M. MALBN, supra note 23,
at 6-13; 1 A. STOKES, supra note 8, at 539-40; Corwin, The Supreme Court As National School
Board, 14 LAw & CONTEmP. PROBS. 3, 11 (1949).
127. Livermore's terminology, introduced August 15, 1789, was: "Congress shall make no
laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 731
(Gales & Seaton eds., 1789).
128. 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985).
129. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, there was a wide diversity of views and

practices among the states regarding established religion. See 3 J.ELLIOT,

DEBATES ON THE
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The language of the religion clauses as ratified does not concern itself
with religion in general, but with the particular problem of the fear of a
national religion. The Framers of the Constitution "had no fear or jealousy
of religion itself, nor did they wish to see us an irreligious people ... ; they
did not intend to spread over all the public authorities and the whole public
action of the nation, the dead and revolting spectacle of an atheistical
apathy."' 30 There was no concern expressed during those first congressional
debates that the government might enact a law beneficial to religion or
religious institutions.13 ' Any doubt on this point was surely dispelled by the
early congressional actions accommodating and even directly benefiting religion in general.3 2 "The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly
that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in
Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to
the Constitution itself."' 3 3 The first amendment reflects the experience of its
framers that an officially preferred or nationally established religion generates
religious intolerance and infringes upon personal liberty. 14 The establishment
clause was not meant to drive a wedge between church and state, but rather
to avoid those relationships between the two which pose a realistic threat of
impairing religious liberty."
The clauses were included in the Bill of Rights:
[N]ot as a protection from religion, but rather as a protection for religion.
They were inserted in our Constitution largely because its framers felt that
they were important to ensure the continuance and the strengthening of

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

330 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter

ELLIOT'S DEBATES]

(Madison's discussion of freedom of religion in Virginia). Madison asserted that the central
government had no right "to intermeddle with religion." Id. The religion clauses were molded
to meet the needs and wishes not only of the people of Virginia, whose proposal was not
adopted, but of the varied and sometimes widely divergent views of all the states on the
appropriate relation of government to religion. The Virginia model cannot reasonably be
presumed to have been the desired prototype of states that for themselves selected very different
models of church/state accommodation. S. COaB, THE RISE OF RELIOIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA
499 (1902).
130. S. REP. No. 376, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1853); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 312 (1952) ("There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the
philosophy that Church and State should be separated ....
The First Amendment, however,
does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State.").
131. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 730-31 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
132. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99-110 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 67578 (1983); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-90 (1983).
133. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 606 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963)).
134. E.g., Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 228 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(Douglas compared bible reading in school with requirement in Franco's Spain that all students
follow religious practices); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 490 (1961) (Court referred to
the Oath of Supremacy required in England to take office in colonies when it found requirement
that Governor of Maryland declare belief in God unconstitutional).
135. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984).
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religion, which could not flourish under American conditions if any State
36
Church were either provided for or tolerated.
The Bill of Rights took effect when the Commonwealth of Virginia finally
ratified the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution on
December 15, 1791. Two years earlier, when the Virginia legislators initially
considered the amendments proposed by the First Congress, they postponed
ratification and stated their objection to the religion clauses:
The [first] amendment, recommended by Congress, does not prohibit the
rights of conscience from being violated or infringed; and although it goes
to restrain Congress from passing laws establishing any national religion,
they might notwithstanding, levy taxes to any amount, for the support of
religion or its preachers; and any particular denomination of Christians
might be so favored and supported by the General Government, as to give
it a decided advantage over others, and in the process of time, render it
as powerful and dangerous as if it was established as the national religion
of the country.
This amendment then, when considered as it relates to any of the rights
it is pretended to secure, will be found totally inadequate, and betrays an
unreasonable, unjustifiable, but a studied departure from the Amendment
proposed by Virginia and other states, for the protection of these rights.However, no change to the wording of the first amendment occurred between
the time of this statement and Virginia's ultimate ratification. As part of
the Bill of Rights, the establishment and free exercise clauses were intended
by the framers to be complementary and comprehensive protections for
religious liberty. The religion clauses had specifically and firmly fixed the
right to free exercise of religious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental
right was an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition against the
establishment of any religion by government.' 38
While it is plain that one of the purposes of the religion clauses through
their placement in the Bill of Rights is to protect personal religious liberty,
it is equally plain that one of the political purposes of the clauses was to
promote civic stability by avoiding institutional conflict along religious lines.' 39
In Everson v. Board of Education,14 0 for example, the Supreme Court quoted
with approval a statement about the "interrelation of these complimentary
clauses" from Harmon v. Dreher,4 ' an opinion of the Court of Appeal of
South Carolina rendered in 1843: "[tlhe structure of our government has,

136. 1 A. STOKEaS, supra note 8, at 539-40.
137. Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 1785-1790, at 62-63 (1828).
138. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
139. See e.g., Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (government
neutrality toward religion prevents powerful sects from bringing about a fusion of governmental
and religious functions, and also guarantees religious observance free of any compulsion from
the state); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (the federal governmental
structure protects public and religious organizations from interfering with each other).
140. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
141. 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87 (1843).
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for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from
it has secured religious liberty
religious interference. On the other hand,
1 42
from the invasion of the civil authority."
In her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 43 Justice O'Connor's analysis
of the establishment clauses identified two evils that could accompany the
excessive interaction of religion and government: (1) the loss of political and
institutional autonomy; and (2) the loss of personal religious liberty.'" The
second portion of her analysis is the often repeated "perception of endorsement" test which played such a critical part of the court's analysis in
Allegheny. 14SThe former evil that Justice O'Connor identified, the loss of
political and institutional autonomy, was described as: "excessive entanglement with religious institutions ...

[that] may interfere with the independ-

ence of the institutions, [and] give the institutions access to government or
governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and46
foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines."'
Thus, the loss of institutional autonomy was not feared just for the
consequences for personal religious liberty but "equally feared because of
its tendencies to political tyranny and subversion of civil authority."', 47 For
this reason, it has long.been held that one of the principal objectives of the
religion clauses is to prevent, "as far as possible, the intrusion of either into
the precincts of the other.' ' 48 It is important, therefore, as one considers
the various public interests served by church and state each to be independent
and autonomous, that together they49share important responsibilities with
deep roots in our national tradition.
History indicates that Jefferson and his contemporaries intended the establishment clause to prohibit the preference of one religion over another,
but not to forbid any assistance, regulation, or other interaction.110 Significantly, benevolence towards religion was not perceived as an evil, an attitude
reflected in the practices of the framers. Rather, support and encouragement
of religion was perceived to be in the public good. What has been lost in
recent cases is not only a return to history but to the primacy of the common

142. Id. at 120.
143. 465 U.S. 668 (1983).
144. Id. at 687-88.
145. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3103-05 (1989).
146. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
147. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961).
148. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 402 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
149. This is not to say that other institutions such as charities and private associations do
not equally share in this responsibility. None, however, have the express constitutional underpinnings that both church and state have in this undertaking.
150. The framers of the religion clauses in the First Congress allowed some state involvement
with religion including payment for chaplains, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983),
a Thanksgiving Holiday, id. at 788, and inclusion of churches in land grants in the new
Northwest Territories. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citing Northwest Ordinance, art. III, ch. VIII, 1789 Stat. 50, 53).

A PLEA FOR CONSISTENCY

1990]

1169

sense judgment that every interaction with religion is not necessarily unconstitutional.
B.

Express Consideration of the Public Interest

The public's interest requires in many instances a healthy and proper
partnership with the state, through the "walls" that have been erected
between church and state in areas where both have a vital stake. 5'
First, for purposes of brief definition, "public interest" denotes the conditions and circumstances which create the opportunity and freedom for
persons to grow and reach their own perfection. The public interest, for
example, consists of the various values people share as citizens and members
of churches, such as educating the young, healing the sick, promoting social
justice, and the like.' 52 At the same time, on a different level, the public
interest consists of the preservation of the social, political, and moral order
under the Constitution which allows, among other things, the exercise of
religious liberty.' The two religion clauses of the first amendment of the
Constitution provide the essential framework for any analysis of how church
and state serve the public interest. As noted above, the religion clauses
confine and constrain either the church or the state only when one acts to
the detriment of the other. 5 4 But falling short of a concrete threat by one
to the other, the Constitution permits church and state to work together
towards common ends and permits reasonable state interaction even in a
church's activities when it promotes the common good. In the last analysis,
serving the public interest means considering all of the relevant interests at
stake in a given situation prior to conflict, especially in considering whether
constitutional interpretation benefits or burdens the public interest.
1.

The Public Interests

Church and state share interests in various activities. Those interests overlap
56
55
and in many instances are the same in, for example, education,' health,

151. Bevilacqua, Foreward-Churchand State: Partners in Freedom, 39 DEPAUL L. REv.
989 (1990).
152. See generally Jom XXIII, MATER ET MAOISTKA: ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF His HOLINESS
POPE JOHN XXIII ON CHRISTLANITY AND SOCIAL PROORESS (1961) (policies of the Catholic church
regarding some of these concerns).
153. J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIOHTS 154-56 (1980); J.C. MURRAY, supra
note 16, at 8-9.
154. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
155. 20 U.S.C. § 2701, 2711 (Supp. VI 1988) (statute providing funding for special needs of
children from low income families, migrant families, or children with handicaps both in public
and private schools); W. BOWER, CHURCH AND STATE IN EDUCATION (1944).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 291, 291a (1982) (appropriations granted to both public and other nonprofit
health facilities); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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social services,' and social justice.' On the other hand, it is clear that
church and state have entirely different perspectives on these interests.
Churches exist primarily to unite their people with their God, and to add
the demands of moral value as a dimension to society by the actions of their
people both individually and collectively to promote equality, fairness, and
justice.5 9 When the church educates, heals, or provides for the welfare of
its people, it does so because its religious mission is made more real through
its actions. On the other hand, the state has certain roles which only it can
fulfill-principally, providing for the common defense and security and
promoting the general welfare of its citizens. When the state acts, it does so
out of its obligation to govern. Disputes arise between church and state over
shared goals concerning the means by which the goals should be achieved.
For example, disputes arise over what standards of excellence we should
educate toward, what is basic health care, and how much is demanded by
obligations of social justice. The public interest is best served when dialogue
and cooperation dominate the relationship and a sense of mutual responsibility permeates the consideration of the public issues.
It is also often noted that both church and state serve the public interest
by creating and maintaining the social, moral, and political environment in
which both can act freely for the benefit of all.'6 In this environment,
religious liberty is constrained only when it directly threatens the liberty of
others or when too close a relationship between church and state may
impermissibly entangle one with the other. On this level, dialogue and
cooperation are also important, especially in attempting to decide when
liberty or assistance ends and interference begins.
2. Constitutional Framework
Whenever churches act on their beliefs, there is the prospect of state
intervention. When state action reasonably promotes the common good, the
intervention is not necessarily unconstitutional. Arbitrary state action, however, offends both common sense and the Constitution. The test of the
reasonableness of a state intervention might normally require a balance of
various "goods" held in common, not the least of which is the integrity of
churches and their ministries. It is not suggested here that the Constitution
authorizes or forbids widespread interference with church activities, only
6
that such facts and circumstances can often blur motives and alter results.' '

157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2931-2932 (1976) repealed by Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
Title VI § 683(a), 95 Stat. 519 (financial assistance granted to both public and private nonprofit

organizations that assist older, low income people).
158.
higher
(1986)
159.
160.
161.

42 U.S.C. § 626 (1982) (appropriations to both "public and nonprofit institutions of
learning" for research in child welfare projects); see Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(use of religious groups in processing undocumented persons for amnesty).
Bernardin, supra note 9, at 7-8.
J.C. MuRAY, supra note 16, at 53, 57-59.
Id.at 162-63.
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State action is seen most often in areas where the churches undertake a
task, such as education, health, child and family services, and social justice,
where the state clearly has an interest as part of its mission to provide for
the welfare of its citizens. Undoubtedly there are times when the government
perhaps has not shown that it appreciates that churches educate or heal
because they see it as vital to their religious mission, and that the government
interferes insensitively in their religious ministry. It is equally true that the
state does not normally intend to displace churches in these areas, but only62
seeks to assure that the welfare of its citizens does not suffer in the process. 1
Whenever churches engage in these tasks, reasonable state regulatory action
is not only expected, but also valid under the free exercise clause. 63 Therefore, when religious organizations raise free exercise clause arguments as a
reflex reaction to reasonable state action, the public interest is not served.
Under the first amendment the state may not control beliefs or thoughts, or
indeed what may be written or spoken. The state may, however, constrain
"expressions," even religious expressions, when they spill into conduct which
may harm another.'6 The proper balance must consider what measure of
restraint of religious liberty is reasonable and consistent with the public
interest.
As one example, consider that both the church and the state have an
interest in education. When the church undertakes education to assure,
among other things, the inculcation of specific values, it seems reasonable
that the state, in order to protect the welfare of its citizens, insist that
teachers be qualified to teach or that the curriculum actually provide a basic
education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 65 the state government was enjoined
from requiring all school children to attend public schools.6 6Here, however,
parental choice was clothed in constitutional garb, yet the fabric was from

162. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognizing propriety
of state regulation for schools but prohibiting mandatory attendance at public school as opposed
to parochial schools).
163. This approach conflicts with the exclusion of religious shelters from the federal emergency grants program proposed by HUD in 1986. See supra note 1.
164. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), carried the belief/conduct dichotomy to an
extreme. The Davis Court upheld the validity of an Idaho territorial law that demanded, as a
condition of voting and holding office, that a person swear that he did not advocate, teach,
or practice polygamy. The effect of the law was to disenfranchise Mormons. The Court noted
the religion clauses are:
[I]ntended to allow everyone under the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain
such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as
may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in
such form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of

others, and to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the
mode of worship of any sect.
Id. at 342 (emphasis added). Thus sentiment and belief are unregulated but conduct is regulated
when it injures the equal rights of others.
165. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
166. Id. at 534-35.
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a government store. The Supreme Court favorably recognized the state's
authority:
[Rleasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine
them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age
attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and
patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenthat nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical
ship must be taught, and
6
to the public welfare.' '
To take another example, both the church and the state have an interest
in child care and support. It is not unreasonable for the state to insist that
children in the care of churches not be treated differently from other children
in other settings-not abused, not denied medical care, be subject to adequate
health practices, etc. One would not tolerate that kind of treatment from
parents in the secular community. There is no concrete threat to religious
liberty by applying the same high standards to all charged with our most6
precious resources. For this reason, current versions of child care legislation 1
carry broad protections of the state, even if the provider is a religious

institution. 169
It is readily conceded that certain state actions abridge religious freedom
in ways not contemplated by the Constitution. The most obvious examples
are the impoundment of funds of the Worldwide Assembly of God by the
Attorney General of California 7 ° and efforts by communities to "regulate"
religious groups from proselytizing on city streets.' 7' Tennessee has a statute
that requires churches to register as political action groups if they lobby on
any legislative proposal.172 Given the number of legislative issues with moral
dimensions, the opportunities for restraint of the mission of churches are
numerous.'7 But examples of reasonable state action, which some would
still call interference, are more numerous. The public interest requires, at a
minimum, that churches understand the constitutional government they seek
to preserve, be sensitive to the roles within society that churches play, and
be wary to litigate over matters in which the church's claim on the common
good is incidental. On the other hand, callous indifference by the state to
the proper role of churches in the formation and implementation of public

167. Id. at 534 (emphasis added). It is true, as Justice Holmes observed, that regulation that
goes too far is a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Basic
education quality standards do not "take" the religious liberty of citizens. In religious schools
church and state are engaged in a partnership to serve the public interest in education. Narrow
self-interest must yield to the public's greater interest.
168. E.g., § 5, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
169. Id. § 8.
170. See California v. Worldwide Church of God, 127 Cal. App. 3d 547, 178 Cal. Rptr. 913
(1982).
171. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
172. Campaign Financial Disclosure Act of 1980, TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-10-101 (1985).
173. See Bemis Pentecostal Church v. Tennessee, 731 S.W.2d 897, 907 (Tenn. 1987) (Act
did not violate First Amendment), appeal dismissed, 485 U.S. 930 (1988).
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policy is lamentable and should be opposed by all persons of good will.
Where the boundary between freedom and restraint is disputed the first
amendment is our only guide. It should not be trivialized by being overused
or overstepped. The common good of the community of churches is best
served by maintaining a set of conditions which assures our liberty to practice
various faiths in peace with the state and with each other. Those conditions
are domestic tranquility and stability, and strict obedience to the first amendment protection of personal religious freedom.
The following is offered as a mechanism for that critical examination by
both church and public institutions when implementing public policy:
1. Are churches engaging in an activity in which the state also has an
interest?
(a) What is the state's interest?
(b) What is the church's interest?
(c) Do these interests compete? Are they coextensive or mutually
exclusive?
2. Where does the public interest lie? Will constitutional conflict promote
the public interest or are other means available to resolve our competing
concerns?
Similarly, notwithstanding history and prudence, whenever church and
state interact, there are those who use the establishment clause as a sword
by reflex rather than by reflection. 174 One should examine whether the action
to be challenged constitutes a concrete threat, not just a threat, of church/
state involvement in such a way that infringes religious liberty. Courts should
not invalidate every interaction between church and state based on conjecture
and speculation, but rather examine the action for the real, not the possible,
and for the practical, not the extreme. 171 The following analysis might be
considered:
1. What is the nature of the action complained of?
2. What is the purpose of the action complained of?
3. Who is (are) the primary beneficiary(ies)?
4. Is there an alternative course available to reach the same purpose and
benefit?
Several pertinent examples of where this kind of analysis could have been
applied in recent cases follow.
For example, in Allegheny, the Supreme Court enjoined the display of a
creche in a public building at private expense1 76 after it had previously upheld

174. E.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (condemning "paranoia" by which separatist groups see religious encroachment in programs). To

a certain extent, those groups are reacting to a pre-Vatican II Catholic Church. The DECLARATION
ON RELIGIOUs FREEDOM, supra note 4, recognized the fact that the Catholic Church was one of
many voices and abandoned a concept of a "catholic" state.
175. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
176. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989), discussed supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
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such a display in a private park in Lynch. The Court distinguished Lynch
by noting that the Lynch creche was placed with secular holiday symbols in
the same display.1 77 One must inquire how the establishment clause values
are harmed by an action whose nature is simply the display of a creche (or,
for that matter any other similar symbol) in the public square essentially by
private organizations and efforts at appropriate times.17 1 In a realistic sense,
the display by permit does not empower the state to challenge, in a concrete
way, the institutional autonomy of churches. Similarly, it allows a church
no special claim under which it could undermine secular authority. It is but
one example of church/state interaction which does not pose a concrete
threat to establishment clause values, which might have been passed even
without challenge. The public is denied a distinct benefit through access by
religious groups to public property on a nondiscriminating basis by assertion
Claus to validate a creche,
of a narrow view. One should not need a Santa
79
or a Christmas tree to validate a menorah.'
Another example is the consistent detrimental impact of Aguilar v. Felton. 1g0 Congress authorized grants to local school districts for public school
teachers to teach educationally and economically disadvantaged children
without regard to the affiliation of the schools they attended. The Supreme
Court nonetheless viewed the establishment clause as a barrier to this benefit
to children on the speculation that some of the interaction might involve
excessive entanglement."' In her dissent, Justice O'Connor accurately noted

177. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3103-05.
178. One should distinguish between a public display that uses public energy and funds and
a truly private display on public premises. The state may have little claim to engage in a
religious exercise, but may not bar private groups from doing so. But see Kaplan v. City of
Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989) (display of menorah in park on a permit basis held
invalid); Doe v. Small, 726 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (court found privately funded display
of pictures of life of Christ in public park violative of establishment clause).
179. In his dissenting opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice Blackmun certainly has the better
of the argument among the Justices about the nature of the display. The creche is a uniquely
religious symbol. It should not be trivialized in its religious significance by a requirement that
it be displayed along side secular symbols in order to justify its placement in public parks.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 726-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On the other hand, one must question
the lack of fairness in any rule of law which bars all such displays from public parks just
because they are religious. As Professor Tribe has indicated: "it seems doubtful that sacrificing
religious freedom on the altar of anti-establishment would do justice to the hopes of the
Framers." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 14-7 (1st ed. 1978).
Similarly, commenting on moves to drive religion from the public schools, the American
Council on Education stated:
[T]o be silent about religion may be, in effect, to make the public school an
antireligious factor in the community. Silence creates the impression in the minds
of the young that religion is unimportant and has nothing to contribute to the
solution of the perennial and ultimate problems of human life.
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF EDUCATION, THE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN DEALING WITH
EDUCATION 6 (1955)
180. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), discussed supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
181. Id. at 412-14.
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the tremendous value that remedial education programs have on the poorest
and most disadvantaged children in our society. If anything, the Supreme
Court's decision in Aguilar v. Felton exacerbates the disadvantages already
possessed by the class of children most in need of remedial attention.
Alternative education adds yet another layer of disruption to the educational
day, requiring children to travel to alternative education sites for their basic
instruction. Such a rule can only serve further to disadvantage these youths
and to derogate the public interest in serving this group of children. After
all, given the absence of a concrete threat to anyone's religious liberty interest
or to the institutional autonomy that exists between church and state, the
Chapter 1 educational programs do not establish religion. It is a disservice
to the public interest to invalidate such programs which promote real educational, economic, and civil rights values in our society, and which do not,
82
except by speculation, challenge either church or state.
In any given situation, not only is it possible, but essential for both church
and state to examine the allegedly or sometimes conflicting values at stake
for evidence of a concrete threat by one to the institutional autonomy of
the other." 3 If the interaction between church and state does not demonstrate
such a threat, then the public interest is served by avoiding conflict and
allowing the interaction.184 Such a result is not only constitutionally permissible but may be socially mandated. Where the threat is real and offers the
means to subvert the aims of one to the other, the Constitution and the
public interest require that it be enjoined and eradicated.
It is unavoidable that at times one would characterize the other's interest
as contrary to the public's. Yet the simple truth is that church and state
both approach the public interest from different perspectives because of
different traditions.' 85 Church and state, when opponents, should characterize
their disagreements more in terms of what is good for society rather than
what is good for themselves. The public interest, in the last analysis, is that
which comes from the dialogue of the disparate and sometimes disharmonious voices. The individual, in personal religious liberty and as a citizen,
will benefit from this kind of interaction.
I1.

CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGY

Mythology is a useful device. It explains to one's posterity a kernel of
truth through the retelling of an important story. Like other myths, constitutional myths are rooted in reality. indeed, the myths that are discussed in
this Article are not by any means the only myths that are perpetuated.
However, there comes a time when one must question whether the story is

182. Id. at 424-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971).
184. It might even be deemed an "incidental" burden. See Abington Township v. Schempp,

374 U.S. 203, 294-96 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
185. See supra notes 23, 129-30.
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worth its continued adherence in law if society is to grow and progress, or
if the story becomes reality itself. Indeed, to the extent that the retelling of
these important stories departs from reality, one must question their value
at all. In order for religious organizations to play a major role in dispute
resolution and advance their own causes and values in the formation of
public policy aimed at reforming society, certain principles must form the
core of constitutional understanding and certain myths must yield to correction by reality. Each myth that follows therefore must be evaluated in light
of its usefulness as a tool and its relationship to reality.
A.

Myth 1: PersonalAutonomy, Not Shared Responsibility, is the Core
of Constitutional Experience

Constitutional law protects individual rights and autonomy. Certainly, this
is a dominant and consistent theme of American culture, with its emphasis
on rugged individualism. The protection of the person and his home is
considered preeminent throughout the history of constitutional litigation." s6
Often the rights of the vulnerable and the minorities were lost to majoritarian
demands, an evil corrected by the courts in this century. Perhaps the closest
legal reflection of judicial social responsibility has been the series of civil
rights decisions to protect the rights of minorities in society over the last
forty years. 1 s7 There is also a trace of this theme in decisions upholding the
New Deal legislation in the 1930's to rescue the nation from the depression.I"
However, over the last several decades, there has also been a dramatic rise
in the emphasis on individual autonomy in society and in the courts.8 9
Legally, the judiciary has moved from protection of disadvantaged minority
groups to the protection of minorities of "one" who are seen as having no
responsibility to society at large.
This trend is seen especially in the current debate on euthanasia, which is
now characterized as the individual, alone and suffering, against the medical
and legal establishments. In this battle, the individual who approaches the

186. For example, although production and distribution of pornography is illegal, one's
ability to possess it within the confines of one's home is protected against the state. Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969). But see Osborne v. Ohio, 58 U.S.L.W. 4467 (U.S. April
18, 1990) (distinguishing Stanley when pornography deals with children).
187. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate educational
facilities [to keep minorities from the majority, white students] are inherently unequal.").
Certainly this attitude is found in cases limiting constitutional prerogatives of parents in favor
of socially-accepted conventions of child protection. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (Court upheld Massachusetts child labor law challenged by Jehovah's Witness who
argued this denied her child opportunity to practice religion).
188. See generally 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15:45, 15:47, 15:48

(1969).
189. The rise in personal privacy as a protected constitutional interest is traced by some to
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and is certainly the essential underpinning of
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). A critique of this area of the law is found in Chopko,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: A Path to Constitutional Equilibrium, CAMPBELL L.
REV. (1990) (forthcoming).

19901

A PLEA FOR CONSISTENCY

1177

judicial system does so as a weak and possibly disadvantaged suitor entitled
to relief from a system that would seek to deny him needed assistance in
achieving what he desires, a painless and swift death. 190 The current emphasis
on individual autonomy makes this result not only possible but foreseeable.
At the same time, there is a diminution of social consensus that once
acted as a bulwark against individual decisions undermining socially accepted
values. 191 For example, some suggest, among other things, that society may
exercise social restraint only insofar as there exists a consensus about the
values which need to be protected. 92 As society continues to fragment, it is
further argued, culture and the values that build society will divide, being
shared only in increasingly smaller groups. Because consensus could only
exist at the lowest common denominator of social values, there would be
fewer opportunities to form consensus on issues of significance. The rush
toward euthanasia, therefore, becomes inevitable, not because it is now
"right" but because society is powerless to stop it. There seems to be little
willingness to use the rule of law or development of public policy as a means
to support a social framework that would condemn the hastening or choice
of death. 93
Although America is certainly peopled by "rugged individualists," the
core experience of American society has been our willingness to care for
each other. Indeed, the earliest colonial experiences in this country were
marked by direct limitation of individual preferences when it served the
common good. Such was the American experience that, were this not possible, the colonists could not survive. 194 Indeed, secular society is based upon
rich religious roots in which a shared community responsibility in the giving
of charity from individuals, the state, and those in authority is expected.

190. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986)
(allowing personal guardian of vegetative patient to remove hydration and nutrition); Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1146-48, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 307-08 (1986) (Compton,
J., concurring) (calling for physician assistance to aid Ms. Bouvia's death). See also infra Part
IV, C.
191. See generally Bernardin, Euthanasia: Ethical and Legal Challenge, 18 OIuoINs 52, 55
(1988); Note, Maine's Living Will Act and the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment, 39
Ma. L. REv. 83, 144-45 (1987).
192. E.g., H.T. ENOLEHARDT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS (1986). For example, Englehardt labels efforts to determine the "best interest" of a patient, "paternalism." Id. at 27984. See also Engelhardt & Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critiqueof Legal Sanctions,
36 Sw. L.J. 1003, 1010-11 (1983) ("a secular state exists not to enforce religious or moral laws
unless those rules are commonly agreed to be to its member's direct earthly benefit").
193. Even though the Hemlock Society ballot initiative in California failed to gather sufficient
signatures to put legalized euthanasia to a referendum, its supporters attribute its failure to
organizational weakness and not to some residual social resistance. For arguments outlining the
Hemlock Society's support of euthanasia see Larue, Patients Should Decide, in EUnTHAASIA:
OPPosINo VIEwPOINTS 149-54 (1989) reprintedfrom Euthanasia:The Time is Now, FRE INQUIRY

(Winter 1988-89).
194. "He who will not work, will not eat" is a maxim that bears witness to the need for
service to the common good of the many.
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Not surprisingly, the legal system grew out of essentially a blending of the
private and public interests. For example, the earliest cases addressing privacy
interests in the United States address individual liberty interests in the context
of protecting and preserving the common good.1 95
The vaccination cases are particularly apt. In those cases, rejecting a claim
of personal liberty to resist vaccination, the Supreme Court upheld the
vaccination not on a public health rationale but on the need to subvert
individual choices to the preservation of the greater good.'9 The contemporary demand for individual preference and autonomy' 97 requires a critical
evaluation by those making public policy and to those in the courts for ways
in which this myth has subverted the reality.
Religious institutions can perhaps arrest this process of diminishing consensus through intelligent, thoughtful, and incisive debate. A society which
finds the rule of law only in the lowest common denominator is not a society
that will take great steps to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and house
the homeless. These actions are contrary to the urge to protect one's own
autonomy-a cultural and legal trend that is rooted in selfishness. Moreover,
to concede that there are different interest groups (as one must) is not to
concede that consensus is impossible. That there are factions means there
will be debate and compromise. If a religious organization is to inform the
legal debate that surrounds controversial issues, it must start with the premise
that social consensus must still exist on significant issues. Even without
"consensus," there might still be some coalition of interests around certain
premises. For example, the interests to live in peace and harmony, to provide
some measure of care for those who are less fortunate, and to combine
resources to educate our children are a few such premises. These interests,
as defined by debate and compromise, may serve as a basis to balance the
demand for absolute individual rights. In reaching those compromises, religious institutions can play an important role in the 1990's.
B.

Myth 2: Uniformity, Not Diversity, is Essential in Preserving the
Civic Peace
Because of the loss of government funding for certain initiatives, this
country is returning to a time when private enterprise and private institutions,
195. E.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 583 (1897) (Court found statute prohibiting
parties from purchasing insurance contracts that did not comply completely with Louisiana law
unconstitutional although Court asserted if state had stronger interests it may consider those
interests over personal liberty to contract).
196. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905).
197. In his concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade, Justice Douglas discussed the nature of
"liberty" as including "autonomous control over the development and expression of one's
intellect, interests, tastes, and personality." 410 U.S. 113, 211 (1973) (emphasis in original).
This right, he said, is "absolute, permitting of no exceptions." Id. No other rights encompassed
by his notion of liberty, including the right of privacy, were labelled "autonomous," and no
other opinion of any Justice or the Court spoke of autonomy in relation to personal liberty or
privacy in Roe. 410 U.S. at 113-223. The first use is thirteen years later in Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, a reaction by a desperate majority to
preserve its first victory. 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
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especially religious institutions, provided social services. 19 As reliance on
private enterprise increased in the 1980's, and as unique and comprehensive
government programs declined, there has been greater conflict, interestingly
enough, among the various private players. Nonreligious organizations see
the participation of religious organizations as a threat to their ability to
market themselves and make profits. Religious groups debate the limits of
government funding and the limits of government regulation.
This trend is amply illustrated in the debate over the child care legislation.
Public education groups and their private interest allies are leading a charge,
under the banner of "separation of church and state," to effectively exclude
religious organizations from realistic participation in the program. Because
religious organizations provide most of the child care in the United States,
the exclusion of such a large segment from the child care program would
favor public schools and others monetarily and eliminate choices of providers, especially for the poor.1 What is lost on these advocates is that there
are many valid delivery models and each one is important to a pluralistic
community. Similarly, proposed rules issued by HUD in 1986 would have
excluded any property owned by religious institutions from participation in
emergency shelter grants. This would include even that property which had
long since been abandoned by the religious institution for any use and would
be ideally suited to this purpose. 2°° Final rules compromise this approach by
asking religious organizations to erect an intermediate secular corporation
to receive the grant. 2 1 Although this proposal was acceptable to those who
provide service, it is an exercise in excessive formality to preserve a principle
of doubtful applicability.
Nonetheless, because the government has increasingly become the leading
provider of certain services for such a long time, uniformity has become
more or less expected. Government services are generally provided in one
way, whether they are in Albuquerque or Albany. But because society is not
uniform and, in fact, is made up of many groups with different cultural and
value identities, there is not only an explanation, but also a justification for
providing different service models in a community. The goal of serving a
genuinely pluralistic community is not achieved by uniform delivery of
services by only one type of provider.
Concern about the drive for exclusion of religious pluralism is not idle
fancy. During the ongoing debate over Kendrick, the plaintiffs do not oppose
the participation of religious organizations in Title XX per se, as much as

198. See Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 238 n.7 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); W. BOWER, supra note 22, at 23-24; see generally B. CouGLrNi,
CHURCH AND
STATE IN SOCIAL WELFARE (1965) (review of policy issues involved in religious groups providing
social services).

199. Liekweg, Participationof Religious Providers in Federal Child Care Legislation: Unrestricted Vouchers Are A ConstitutionalAlternative, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 565 (1989). See
Chopko, Don't Exclude the Churches, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
200. See supra note 1.
201. See 24 C.F.R. § 575.21 (1989).
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they oppose religious organizations which had views that were different than
theirs on the question of abortion.2" 2 If they prevail, the result is not
pluralism, but uniformity in accord with their own values. That is not only
unfair, but it is also constitutionally suspect. It has been said, "[i]f we lose
the right to be different, we lose the right to be free. 203 That proposition,
which has important colonial roots, 204 should be a foundation for sound
legal policy.
The debate over the first amendment began with Congress deciding whether
a first amendment was needed at all. James Madison, long labeled the father
of the first amendment, was certainly of the view that there was no need to
expressly protect the freedom of religious organizations and believers and
nonbelievers in the new United States. 05 At the time of the revolution, there
were several hundred denominations in the United States and, it was said,
the number of unchurched persons in the United States was so great that
"America constituted the largest body of unchurched in all of Christendom. '1 2 0 Thus, Madison concluded that it would be quite impossible for the
20 7
national government ever to establish a religion at the expense of others.
Nonetheless, several states believed that an express guarantee of religious
20
liberty was important and thus, the first amendment was adopted. 1
The first amendment elevated the rights of the many and the powerless
over the privileges of the few and powerful. It guaranteed more than
tolerance-it guaranteed that the state must not favor one religion over
another. A tolerant state might establish one religion but permit others. 209
In this country, the constitutional tradition has been neutrality, that is, the
government may neither favor nor disfavor any or all religions. The advantage of this system is in its protection for individual liberty. But more than
that, for institutional liberty, it assured the ability of churches outside the
realm of government, neither dependent on nor subject to the government,
to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its

dogma.

'

210

In order to inform the public policy debate through the courts or the
legislature, a call for a diverse and sometimes divergent public policy must

202.

See Reske, The Abortion Counseling Case, 74 A.B.A. J. 76, 78-9 (June 1988); ACLU

NEWS 1, 1-3 (Oct. 26, 1983).

203. Remarks of James Wood, Baylor University, Gathering of Christians, May 24, 1988.
204. Cf. 2 J. Kent, Commentaries of American Law, Lecture XXIV (1826, da Capo ed.)
("When the spirit of liberty has fled, and truth and justice are disregarded, private rights can
easily be sacrificed under the forms of law.")

205. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 129, at 330.
206. Cf. I A. STOKES, supra note 8,at 228-30; J.C. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 58.
207. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 129, at 330; See I ANNALS OF CoNoaass, supra note
23, at 731.
208. These states were New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina and Virginia. S.
supra note 23, at 508.
209. L. WHIPPLE, supra note 12, at 72.
210. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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be rooted in constitutional terms. If the founders intended to protect the
rights of the many, neither favoring nor penalizing any group, they could
not be understood to mean that only one kind of religion or religious values
would be allowed to participate in the national life. Moreover, given the
historical reality that education and social services were in the hands of the
churches at the time of the Revolution, 21 ' the founders could not be understood to adopt a system which would have radically restructured the way
that American life was then lived. Rather, they might well be offended to
witness the rush to an increasingly secular society at the expense of religion.
C.

Myth 3: Churches May Not Be Trusted to Observe the Constitution

There is a certain myth propounded in the constitutional litigation that
religious organizations serving the general public are inherently proselytizers.
Thus, the argument goes, they cannot be trusted to manage public funds
effectively, because at the slightest lapse in government vigilance, they will
immediately resort to preaching and conversion. This attitude colored the
perceptions of both the majority in Grand Rapids212 and Aguilar,2' as well
as the district court in Kendrick.1 4 People who believe that religious conversion can be accomplished through the use of federal funds for remedial
mathematics or for emergency counseling of pregnant teenagers are also
likely to believe that the blood shed in the crusades or in religious wars in
Europe created authentic conversion. They do not seem to understand that
conversion is person-by-person and from mind to heart. They persist in their
innate distrust that religious organizations engage in the public debate to
impress, like the crusaders of the twelfth century, one set of values and
convictions upon an unwilling population. This distrust has now been fueled
by additional national scandal caused by clergy in some denominations.
What religious organizations need to be is more effective in communicating
their reasons for public service.
Drawing on the principle of pluralism for legal argument, religious organizations often participate in the provision of either education or social services
as witness of their concern for the life of the community. Their mission in
providing service is not to convert, but to serve. This message has not been
communicated through litigation and in the public policy arena, because
although the message is spoken, it is not heard; what people hear is that
churches seek to proselytize. On the contrary, religious organizations seek
to engage in the formation of policy because they have something valuable
to contribute to the debate. 2 51 In a pluralistic society, that is the most anyone
can do or expect.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See
473
473
657
See

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
U.S. 373 (1985).
U.S. 402 (1985).
F. Supp. 1547, 1564-66 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
Bernardin, supra note 9, at 6.
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In an effort to compensate for this phenomenon, many religious organizations strive to make themselves look like secular organizations, providing
the same services as secular groups without limitation or reservation, and
without reference to unique values and mission. This is especially unfortunate
because it draws on the secular model as the only "good" or "realistic"
model for delivery of education or social services. It makes more difficult
the legal defense of the few privileges and exemptions obtained for religious
organizations (such as labor and other specific statutory exemptions), and
makes it easier for secular groups that target religious involvement to charge
that religious organizations are themselves responsible for the loss of moral
suasion in this country.
For religious institutions, public policy and legal strategy must be subsumed
in the inherent mission of churches to serve, engage, and transform the
society, by witness, action, dialogue, and persuasion. Such a strategy may
then inform those making the laws or judging their validity to understand
that churches do not seek to convert but to inform-that churches do not
seek to impose, but to dialogue.

IV.

TOWARD A CONSISTENT LEGAL THEORY-OTHER APPLICATIONS

The search for constitutional value and the use of the public interest as a
guide for resolving disputes (including adjudication) invites the application
of constitutional value theory to other areas. The broader this theory is
applied in other areas, the more utility it might have. Of particular conceptual
importance is the way in which this method of dispute resolution leads
towards a consistent legal theory-a theory providing some certainty as to
the manner in which issues will be approached and under which disputes
may be properly evaluated and ultimately resolved. Given the unique origins
of this theory and its particular context-rooted as it is in Catholic social
and political writings-the utility of this methodology might lack a broader
appeal and application. However, as a process for exploring constitutional
issues permeating with moral questions, it might be a useful exercise. In
turn, this Article briefly touches three areas for possible exploration: indecency, civil rights, and euthanasia. 1 6 Others will have to determine ultimately
after further analysis whether the methodology works.
A.

Indecency

There are many rights and interests that are implicated in the regulation
of indecent speech. Both sides in this debate claim that important first
amendment speech interests are implicated by any kind of intrusion, forced
or unforced, into the area of the creation and dissemination of information,
entertainment, or ideas by any medium. Writers, cinematographers, store

216. Indeed, even briefer reflection is offered on the subject of capital punishment and the
eighth amendment. See infra note 247.
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owners, among others, and the public all claim rights to create, sell, or
receive certain information or material that entertains, educates, panders, or
even titillates to one's own personal satisfaction.
Others are concerned about the impact that such material has on the
greater society. For example, to the extent that such material tends to exploit
or trivialize women, 217 it is certainly a serious concern for all to assure equal
treatment and dignity for women as unique persons, both in society and in
the law. Certainly, the dissemination of indecent material also implicates
218
certain parental interests in the upbringing and education of children.
Acting on these concerns, the state claims broad regulatory power over the
219
dissemination of indecent material at least in the broadcast medium.
The balance of these barriers, rights and interests, is of course, often the
prerogative of the Federal Communications Commission 220 or the courts. In
numerous cases, the Supreme Court has given some direction to the regulatory problem presented by indecent material. For example, the Court has
long held that the protection of children does not require reducing adults to
receiving only that information which is appropriate for children. 22' This
does not necessarily mean that children must be exposed to indecent material
as the price of living in a free society. But, as every parent knows, difficult
social and ethical questions are often beyond the ability of children either
to comprehend or learn, whether indecent or not.
Last term in Sable Communications v. FCC, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a twenty-four hour ban on telephone subscription services
that rigorously promote indecent material was not sustainable. 222 The Court
explained that the broad first amendment protections over the creation and
dissemination of material could not be abridged absent a record demonstrating any invidious harm to children that would require a broader application
223
of regulatory authority.
There would appear to be a strong sense of intentional values inherent in
the speech clause to protect the freedom to create and disseminate material
even if it might offend the taste or sensibility of others in society. The
217. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-32 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
218. Ferber v. New York, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) ("It is evident beyond the need for
elaboration that a State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of
a minor is compelling") (citation omitted); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968).
219. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
220. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 303, 639 (Regulating obscene
or harassing telephone calls in interstate communications, transmission of radio communications
containing profane or obscene words).
221. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
222. 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989) (Court upheld the constitutionality of "dial-a-porn" regulations
by upholding a blanket prohibition on obscene speech by a 6-3 margin while unanimously
invalidating a blanket ban on indecent speech).
223. Id. at 2837-38, 2840 (Scalia, J., concurring) This conclusion was also supported on the
ground that an alternative approach less restrictive than a 24-hour ban was available but untried.
Id. at 2837-38.
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Canterbury Tales of Chaucer are often cited as one of somewhat bawdy
material that is nonetheless literature often studied and repeated. 2 4 Given
this historic and intentional commitment towards the freedom to create and
disseminate information enshrined in the speech clause, the sufficient interest
of parents and others for the education of their children, and the interest in
the growing equality and mutual respect that is penalized somewhat by the
unrestricted dissemination of indecent material, the balance of these objectives becomes more critical. The courts have skewed the balance in favor of
225
broadcasters, writers and other creators and disseminators of information.
The ultimate question for us is the extent to which the balance of these
various interests must be adjusted in light of the public's interests. Depending
on the weight attached to the various values in competition, one reaches
different conclusions. Most important for both the application of the methodology described above, as well as the resolution of the numerous disputes
that do in fact occur, is the consideration of the public's interests. On
balance, the public's interest would seem to require express consideration of
all the values rather than the views of one side to the exclusion of the
other. 22 6 The precise balance and blend of the various interests is, of course,
difficult. But one might see that there are some positive applications for a
different balance based on express application of the above methodology.
For example, the FCC has routinely considered whether it might write rules
227
limiting the broadcast of indecent material to particular times and places.
Many object categorically to any restraints over the dissemination or broadcast of indecent material. Such demands, unbalanced in their considerations
of the other interests and rights that are implicated as discussed above,

224. Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Board of Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-90 (1959) (invalidating
New York statute which banned screening of "Lady Chatterley's Lover").
225. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-32 (7th Cir. 1985).
226. For example, there are some that would advocate a complete ban of indecent material
from the airwaves without regard to either the constitutional tradition which we inherit or the
ways in which the application of this governmental power might be used to the detriment of
others in the future. The Constitution appears to have set certain personal interests ahead of
those of the government. Compare Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("If the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone
in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.") with United States
v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971) (Stanley "does not require that we fashion or recognize a
constitutional right . . . to distribute or sell obscene materials"). But see Osborne v. Ohio, 58
U.S.L.W. 4467 (April 18, 1990). The price that one pays for the maintenance of this freedom,
is the willingness to endure, perhaps, the results of someone else's use of those personal
freedoms.
227. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the use of Common Carriers for the Transmission
of Obscene Materials, Third Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd 2714 (1987); Enforcement of
Prohibitions Against the use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Materials,
Second Report and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699 (1985); Enforcement of Prohibitions Against
the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Materials, Report and Order,
49 Fed. Reg. 24,966 (1984). See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
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subvert one set of the public's rights and interests to others. Reasonable
regulations along these lines would appear to be not only consistent with
the intentional values that would guide consideration, but also the public's
22
interest in compromise and balance as a way of articulating public policy.
The methodology offers a different way of addressing and resolving an old
problem.
B.

Civil Rights

Religious institutions have a particular concern with the actions of employee nonadherents. From time to time, both Congress and the courts have
considered this issue and, with limited exception, the rights of religious
organizations have been affirmed. Two recent cases illustrate the competition
among the various rights and interests and the ways in which lines have been
drawn by the courts.
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 2 9 the
Supreme Court held that the federal courts should allow state agencies to
impose civil rights jurisdiction over a private Christian schools as long as
the private school's constitutional objections would be sufficiently heard in
the course of the proceedings. The school discharged one of its teachers for
failing to adhere to one of the practices of the denomination. The teacher
complained of discriminatory treatment at the hands of her employers to
the state civil rights authorities, who started an investigation. One obvious
social good was the protection of the individual from discriminatory employment practices. The school, as a religious organization, on the other
hand, insisted on its right to discipline a member of its faith community
without interference by the state, 230 another obvious social good and likewise
part of the public's interest. In this blend, the private interest offered by
the teacher should have yielded to the interest offered by the religious
organization. The important element in blending the public interests and
23' 1
seeking compromise is "choice.
In such disputes, the area of religious choice is an important consideration
in evaluating the public interest. The history of this country's experience
with religious conflicts demonstrates that choice of religious faith carries
with it certain indemnities. 2 2 One is consenting to the rights and authority

228. Father Murray has addressed the problem of censorship. See J.C. MURAY, supra note
16, at 155.
229. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
230. E.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (first and
fourteenth amendments prohibit civil courts from disturbing or being bound by decisions of
ecclesiastical tribunals).
231. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871) ("In this country the full and free
right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any
religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does
not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all.")
232. Consent to discipline even immunizes the denomination against certain torts while the
person is a member of the faith. Higgins v. Maher, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 258 Cal. Rptr. 757
(1989); Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1988).
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of the denomination over certain matters. Given the freedom by which
people might stay or leave a denomination for no reason or any reason, 233
"it would be a vain consent and would lead to subversion of such religious
bodies, if anyone aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the
secular courts and have them reversed. ' 234 Thus, courts have adopted a
broad rule excluding civil courts from the adjudication of church disputes,
a rule that should apply when the merits of the employment dispute in the
Dayton Christian School are considered.
Similarly, when the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints discharged
one of its janitors for failing to obtain a "temple recommend," a certificate
of his good standing in that church and a condition for maintenance of his
job, many in the civil rights community were offended. Nonetheless, in Title
VII, Congress has chosen to exclude religious entities from federal employment jurisdiction, as a means to eliminate conflict between state authorities
and religious organizations about which positions an employee would be
subject to the law and which ones an employee would not. 2" The Supreme
Court, when confronted by the issue, upheld the validity of the Title VII
exemption in 1987.236 The private "goods" involved in this determination
are similar to those presented by the teacher employee in the earlier example;
the public "goods" are likewise similar. In sustaining the congressional
balance of the various interests forming the public interest, the courts
recognized that the freedom of religious organizations to pursue their missions in relative peace was a higher value than the individual rights of those
who might be offended by such choices. 237
C. Euthanasia
Making public policy concerning euthanasia and the direction of the time
and manner of one's death is uniquely difficult. On the one hand, privacy
interests implicated under the Constitution would appear to encompass a
certain range of medical choice.23 However, of equal, if not greater, moment
is that the state has long been held to have an interest in the prevention of
suicide. 23 9 Where one claims the right to end one's life, such a right, proposed
as a matter of personal autonomy-unlimited, exclusive self-determination-

233. Struemph v. McAuliffe, 661 S.W.2d 559, 563-64 (Mo. App. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 2659 (1984).
234. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
235. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982).
236. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
237. But see Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding discrimination policies inherent in the tax code over a free exercise challenge).
238. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584-86 (D.R.I. 1988) (concern whether a gastrointestinal tube even constituted medical treatment).
239. For a general history of policies regarding suicide, see Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone &
Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1985).
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has never been a part of the foundation of our democratic system. The
Supreme Court long ago rejected such a proposition as antithetical to
24
individual freedom within an ordered society. ° In Bowers v. Hardwick, 1
the Supreme Court summarized over a half century of constitutional jurisprudence and noted that, only those rights found within history and tradition
to be necessary to a free society had been incorporated in a concept of
liberty under the fourteenth amendment and preserved against state interference through some amorphus right to privacy.2 42 Unrestricted personal
autonomy in choosing the manner and place of one's death is not within
these rights. On the other hand, the common law already contains a rough
approximation of a balance of these interests in the nature of a public
interest determination.
The common law allows for the express consideration of other interests
besides one's interpretation of a personal interest, including, as a balance to
the personal interest, the interest of a state in preventing suicide, the interest
of innocent third parties (such as family members that might be impacted
by such a decision), and the way in which that proposed exercise impacts
the practice and ethics of medicine. 243 For this reason, courts have been

reluctant to expand elements of self determination to include "a right to
dictate the circumstances under which life is to be ended." '2" "[Tihe resulting

deference to legislatures may prove wise in light of the complex character
of the rights at stake and the significant potential that, without careful
statutory guidelines and gradually evolved procedural controls, legalizing
euthanasia, rather than respecting people, many endanger personhood." ' 24'

The precise calculus of these various rights and interests is presented to
the United States Supreme Court currently in Cruzan v. Harmon.24

In

Cruzan, the parents of a patient in a persistent vegetative state claimed the
right to terminate her nutrition and hydration as an expression of her personal
right of self determination. Some question, correctly, the expansive notion
of personal autonomy found within this asserted right. The common law, it
is said, will adequately protect this interest in self determination without
sacrificing all the other interests. The recognition of a broad unrestrained
personal interest against all others could set the individual's choices against
the interest of family, society, the medical profession and the ethics of the
very practitioners chosen by the patient. The patients rights would become
supreme and all other interests including those who believe that such choice

240. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905).
241. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
242. Id. at 190-92.
243. Compare In re Eichner, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981) (approving disconnection of respirator) with In re Storar, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64 (refusing approval
to forego blood transfusion), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
244. L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1370 (2d ed. 1988).
245. Id. (footnote omitted).
246. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (July 3, 1989) (No. 88-1503).
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is antithetical under certain conditions, would be rejected. Such a result, it
is asserted, would not only be contrary to the public interest, but would also
be unethical. Further
application of the methodology proposed could be
247
usefully pursued. ,

V.

CONCLUSION

If this Article has accomplished anything, it has perhaps illustrated the

need for further work in the area of church/state relations, unfortunately
characterized more by conflict than by restrained conflict resolution. For
courts and scholars, this Article points to the need for both more research
into the kinds of values which underlie the constitutional text as well as
ways more routine invocation of those values give fuller meaning to the text.
Plainly much more can be done. The status quo always has its staunch

defenders sometimes clothed in the garb of academic inquiry. More work
can and should be done, and the debate should be joined, perhaps in the
journals. One would suspect that it will continue whether or not the debate
is informed in the courts.
To those, like this author, who strain to do justice to the aspirations of
their faith communities as religious organizations, this Article counsels restraint. Conflict has been long and bitter, and perhaps is irreversible. Absent
a better decisionmaking tool, that would certainly seem to be the case. The

case is made here, not for constitutional slogans for our banners and bumper
stickers, but for return to the common commitment to constitutional value.
To this, one other element is added, a commitment that we all share the
same society, linked together in mutual interdependence under a theory of

247. A similar line of reasoning could be employed to discern means of resolving disputes
on capital punishment. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the principle that, because
our colonial forbearers regularly executed criminals, the imposition of capital punishment is
not, per se, unconstitutional under the eighth amendment which forbids cruel and unusual
punishment. Under colonial governments, capital punishment was certainly not unusual and,
given the wide variety of practices, could not be deemed cruel. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109
S. Ct. 2969 (1989). By contrast, twentieth century jurisprudence focuses more on those kinds
of practices which "mark the progress of an evolving society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958). That invites either speculation about the meaning of these contemporary times or,
in the theory of this Article, a search for means to resolve those apparent disparities between
original intentions and contemporary times, by seeking ways that are faithful to both. This
would be a subject for a more thorough investigation into the generative history of the eighth
amendment and a more thorough-going search for constitutional value. It would seem, at a
minimum, that the colonials believed in effective punishment for crime but yet had enough
sense of distributive justice that they did not want their society to be marked by the kinds of
practices that characterized some of the excesses of monarchical Europe. It would be worth
investigating, therefore, whether some new constitutional theory of adjudication could be
adopted based on these and perhaps other constitutional values and comparing those values to
the ways in which disputes are actually resolved. The pattern of arguments raised and, consequently, lost by opponents of the imposition of capital punishment in this society counsels an
approach based on restraint and perhaps reconsideration of the basic strategy. Such is the stuff
of further research.
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constitutional government that preserves our diverse practices under the
religion clauses of the first amendment. Use of a public interest standard,
along the lines suggested above, at least offers the hope of finding a way
out of this constitutional morass in which many have become lost over the
last two centuries. This Article is not the first, nor will it be the last, to call
for such express reference to the public interest. Given the repeated calls,
one must ask whether the truth, searched for since the time of this Republic,
is not one shrouded in the substantive language of any text or form, but
rather is found in the common experience of human persons searching for
a process by which they may live together in peace.

